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Abstract
The Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise (CRE)
exists to rapidly respond to a domestic CBRN attack in order to minimize the overall
impact of an incident. Over the past 16 years, the CRE has grown incrementally, and
it is unclear if the current locations of units optimizes the coverage of the US pop-
ulation within a rapid response window. In this paper we develop a multi-objective
multi-service extension of the maximal covering location problem (MCLP) to analyze
the current coverage provided by the CRE and recommend efficient modifications to
better protect the American population. While public sector facility location prob-
lems are well studied, the significant damage created by a CBRN attack requires
unique modeling considerations. Most notably, we model the impact to coverage
when CRE units within a minimum stand-off distance are rendered non-functional
by a CRBN attack using an adaptation of the conditional covering problem (CCP).
This minimum stand-off distance is not currently a consideration in existing Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) doctrine or planning guidance, but through a comparison to
the current DoD definition of coverage we demonstrate the value of incorporating
this concept into future planning considerations. Finally, we account for the multi-
objective nature of this problem by developing a set of non-inferior solutions that
allow a decision maker to apply their judgment to balance the trade-off between cov-
erage and cost. Overall, this analysis demonstrates the value of incorporating facility
location models into future DoD decisions.
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OPTIMIZING THE DOMESTIC
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
RESPONSE ENTERPRISE
I. Introduction
“The most fundamental duty of the Department of Defense is to pro-
tect the security of U.S. citizens. The homeland is no longer a sanctuary
for U.S. forces, and we must anticipate the increased likelihood of an at-
tack on U.S. soil.” [42]
– 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
1.1 Background
The use of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) weapon in a
domestic terror attack remains one of the nation’s most significant security threats.
While prevention is the first priority, the nation must be prepared to respond to a
domestic CBRN attack. The Department of Defense (DoD) maintains the CBRN
Response Enterprise (CRE) to leverage internal assets to support civil authorities in
the response to such an attack. The DoD defines the mission for this force as follows:
“DoD will maintain a CBRN response enterprise that balances Federal
and State military responsibilities in order to reduce the response times
to save lives and minimize human suffering.” [15]
Development of the CRE began in the mid 1990s following domestic terror attacks
and a perceived gap in the nation’s ability to respond to a CBRN incident. Over the
1
past 16 years, the structure of CRE has rapidly evolved from a force of 300 National
Guard personnel in 1998, to over 15,000 personnel comprised of both National Guard
and Federal forces. These changes occurred predominantly after government spon-
sored reports identified gaps in the structure and capabilities. While the force is more
prepared than ever to respond to a domestic CBRN incident, the DoD acknowledges
improvements in the structure still exist and states it “will continue to improve CBRN
force posturing and refine force sourcing processes to meet future national require-
ments for domestic CBRN incident response” [15]. The initial shaping of the force,
driven primarily by qualitative metrics, appears to be reaching its pinnacle and large
gains in the response capability provided by the force are less likely. The analysis of
the CRE now needs a quantitative assessment to identify refinements in its structure
that can produce a more efficient force.
An area that has received little attention is an analysis of the CRE unit locations
and how well they cover the population within a rapid response window. While
the siting of CRE units was accomplished in a deliberate manner, the incremental
establishment of units may have created inefficiencies within the structure. To date
there does not appear to be a clear understanding of whether the current location
of CRE units optimizes coverage of the population. An analysis of the layout of
the CRE utilizing previously proven quantitative modeling techniques can provide
a better understanding of the current array’s coverage capabilities compared to an
optimal structure.
Before further clarifying the scope of this thesis, a description of the units that
comprise the CRE is warranted. The CRE has a federal component and a National
Guard component that are structured in completely different manners, each worthy
of their own detailed analysis. Since the National Guard currently constitutes 70% of
the CRE [14], this study will focus on a holistic analysis of the locations of National
2
Guard CRE elements. The National Guard component of the CRE currently consists
of three echelons: Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs),
CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and Homeland Response
Forces (HRFs). The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the capabili-
ties of units at each echelon.
Figure 1. Unit Location of CERFPs and HRFs
WMD-CSTs constitute the first response of the CRE. Their primary mission “is to
assist in identification and assessment of CBRNE hazards and advise first responders
and follow on forces” [15]. There are currently 57 WMD-CSTs with at least one in
each state and one in, Washington D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
(Henceforth, we use the term state to generically refer to a state, commonwealth,
3
territory, protectorate, or district.) Florida, California, and New York each have two
based on their large populations.
First instituted in 2004, the CERFP is the next level of response at the state
level. Their capabilities, as described in Joint Publication 3-41, consist of “casualty
search and extraction, emergency medical triage, treatment, and patient stabilization,
and mass casualty decontamination, in a contaminated environment” [35]. There are
currently 17 CERFPs located across the United States, as illustrated in Figure 1, with
at least one per Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region. The states
located in each FEMA region are depicted in Figure 2. Each CERFP is comprised of
approximately 186 personnel.
Figure 2. FEMA Regions [19]
The final element of the state response, the HRF, was first instituted in 2012. Each
HRF consists of roughly 570 personnel, provides the same capability as a CERFP,
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but also adds a brigade-size command and control headquarters and a battalion-size
security component. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a
HRF is designed to manage up to five CSTs and three CERFPs [59]. There are
currently ten HRFs, one aligned with each FEMA region, at locations as illustrated
in Figure 2.
1.2 Problem Statement
The location of each WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF impacts the CRE’s ability
to rapidly respond to a CBRN incident. Rapid response is critical to saving lives
and minimizing human suffering, which is at the core of the CRE mission. While
the current array seems sufficient, it is unknown if a better configuration exists. Fur-
thermore, the structure of the CRE was established incrementally and has never been
fully analyzed as a whole. The current distribution of these units needs to be assessed
to determine how well they currently cover the population within a rapid response
window. Additionally, given the current fiscal climate, a balance between costs and
capability is required; added costs must result in a significant gain in response ca-
pability provided to the population. Finally, the proximity of some CRE units to
large population centers places these units at risk of being crippled by a large-scale
CBRN incident. The inability of the closest CRE unit to perform their assigned mis-
sion would lead to a dramatic increase in response time and could lead to additional
deaths and suffering. Options need to be explored that minimize this risk. Thus, we
seek to develop CRE unit locations that maximize the population covered in a rapid
response window while minimizing the cost of modifications to the existing structure
and reduce risk to CRE units.
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1.3 Approach
To date, there is no published research applying facility location models to analyze
the CRE. Facility location problems have been, however, utilized extensively in the
siting of Emergency Response Services (ERS) facilities, such as fire and police stations
[20] [40] [45] [47] [57] [60]. Siting CRE units and ERS facilities share many similar
objectives and constraints that encourage the use of similar mathematical modeling
techniques. Thus, we include a commonly utilized ERS objective that maximizes
the population covered for a fixed set of assets (i.e., a Maximal Covering Location
Problem (MCLP) [27]) in the model development. To account for costs, we develop
a set of non-inferior solutions that identify the trade-off between coverage gained
and modifications to the existing structure. Finally, elements from the conditional
covering problem (CCP) [26] [50] are included to model the impact of a CBRN event
rendering a CRE unit non-functional within a minimum stand-off distance.
1.4 Assumptions
To narrow the scope of this thesis, several assumptions are required. This section
covers our general assumptions about the CRE and its capabilities to define the
limits of the analysis. More specific assumptions are presented in Chapter 3 that
relate specifically to the model development.
Outside the scope of this study is an examination of the division of the the CBRN
Response Enterprise into three echelons and the respective capabilities that exist at
each echelon. Furthermore, we assume that these units provide the necessary capa-
bility desired to respond to an event. Clearly, this assumption relies upon external
factors such as the type and magnitude of a given CBRN event and the readiness of
the CBRN forces. Should the structure of the force be changed to include different
echelons and capabilities, the foundation of the analysis would still hold true, requir-
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ing only adjustment to some of the specific model parameters to remain informative.
1.5 Summary
This chapter highlighted the exiting CBRN threat, the CRE, its core components,
and a gap in the current analysis of its structure. The goal of this analysis is to apply
mathematical modeling techniques to assess the current structure’s influence on rapid
response. The model also considers costs and identifies the impact to coverage if CRE
units are rendered non-functional by a CBRN incident within a minimum stand-off
distance. Finally, key assumptions were presented that limit the scope of the analysis.
In the following chapter we highlight the existing literature relevant to the CBRN
Response Enterprise and facility location models that are necessary to inform the
analysis. In Chapter 3 we provide the formulation of our model and justification for
parameter estimates. The analysis of results and a model extension are presented in
Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5 we present significant insights and areas for future
research.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
This chapter reviews previously published doctrine and research focused on the
CBRN response enterprise (CRE) and facility location modeling. The CRE litera-
ture provides a historical overview of the development of the CRE, demonstrates the
importance of the CRE within the DoD, familiarizes the reader with its basic employ-
ment, and discusses the current standards for coverage. Additionally, we demonstrate
the limited quantitative analysis of the existing CRE structure. Finally, facility loca-
tion models and their application that inform our model developed in Chapter 3 are
reviewed.
2.2 CRE Development
The origin of the CRE started with the Defense Against Weapons of Mass De-
struction Act in 1996. This Act required the improvement of domestic preparation
and response capability to a CBRN attack [5] and provided funding for the devel-
opment of response capabilities. As a result, the DoD was directed to develop a
strategy to leverage its internal capabilities in support of CBRN response. The initial
strategy was modeled to support response to events similar to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing and the 1995 Tokyo Sairn gas attack. In 1997, the Undersecretary
of Defense directed the investigation of integrating the National Guard and reserve
components for CBRN response [5], and in 1998 this initial plan for integration was
approved. It began by establishing ten WMD-CSTs (initially referred to as Rapid
Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams), one in each FEMA region. These
WMD-CSTs were state controlled National Guard assets that would assist local re-
sponders with detecting the presence of CBRN effects and estimating their impact.
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Over the next nine years additional teams were established such that, by 2007, each
state or territory sourced a certified WMD-CST based within their boundaries [30].
Each WMD-CST consists of 22 full-time personnel who serve in a Title 32 status
from the Army and/or Air National Guard1. Teams are controlled by the sourc-
ing state but are able to respond to incidents in other states, either through state
coordination or federalization by the President of the United States [36].
As analysis of the CBRN consequence management continued, the DoD recognized
there were still gaps in providing initial decontamination and search and extraction to
an overwhelmed local response. CERFPs were first developed in 2003 to fill this gap
and were modeled on an existing CBRN response force in the Marine Corps. In 2004,
12 teams were established, with at least one in each FEMA Region; an additional
five teams were added in 2006. It is not clear from the open source literature why
17 CERFPs was deemed to be the appropriate number of units. In fact, a RAND
report from 2010 suggested there was not a clear understanding of the capabilities
required to respond to a CBRN incident and that the current structure, while useful,
had not been fully analyzed [1]. This seems to suggest that the number of CERFP
units needed may not be fully understood. While outside the scope of this research,
a future study could analyze how the existing capabilities of the CRE would support
a CBRN incident based in terms of expected throughput of decontamination, search
and extraction, and medical triage.
As mentioned before each CERFP consists of approximately 186 personnel drawn
from pre-existing units from the sourcing state, and each unit within the CERFP
maintains its organic mission along with the CERFP mission. A unit is described
as pre-existing because it was not specifically created to serve as a component of
the CERFP, and the organic mission is the mission the unit prepared for prior to it
1Title 10, USC (under federal control and federally funded); Title 32, USC (under state control
and federally funded); and state active duty (under state control and state funded).
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assuming the additional mission as a CERFP component. For example, the search
and extraction element of the CERFP is commonly drawn from an engineer company
within a sourcing state. The engineer company trains to serve as the search and ex-
traction component of the CERFP, and it also trains for its organic engineer mission.
Unlike WMD-CSTs, the personnel assigned to a CERFP are maintained in a reserve
status2 and are mobilized in response to an incident. Additionally, a CERFP can
consist of units sourced from different states.
In addition to CERFPs, the DoD also began to establish a response force from the
federal forces called the CBRN Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF).
The initial plan called for three CCMRFs, each a brigade size unit consisting of ap-
proximately 4,500 personnel drawn from different federal units across the country.
The CCMRFs were designed to serve as the next layer of response after the CERFP.
Given the geographic dispersion of the force, the expected response time for this
force was 48-96 hours after notification [32]. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Re-
view, however, the DoD recognized the CCMRFs were not able to rapidly respond to
an incident, leaving a gap between the state and federal response. To bridge this gap,
the DoD reduced and reorganized the federal component of the CRE and increased
the size of the National Guard component of the CRE by adding an additional ech-
elon, the HRF. Shifting more of the force to the National Guard established a more
regionally based approach [15] which improved rapid response and thus the life saving
capability of the CRE. This new structure replaced the CCMRFs with the Defense
CBNRE Response Force (DCRF) and two Command and Control Response elements
(C2CRE) on the federal side, and established ten HRFs on the National Guard side.
This change placed forces more geographically proximate to possible CBRN incident
sites and provided more forces under the control of a sourcing state’s governor, thereby
2Reserve status refers to personnel not assigned to their duties full-time but does not imply they
are apart the US Army Reserve.
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reducing the delay caused by the bureaucratic nuances of employing federal forces.
The exact command and control structure within the CRE is still evolving, but
“the HRFs are supposed to establish a regional command and control structure to
synchronize State Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard CBRN response forces
including CERFPs and prepare for follow-on forces.” [59] . Each HRF is expected
to focus on planning, training, and exercising authority within its respective FEMA
region to establish links between the local, state, and federal authorities. A majority
of the HRF personnel, roughly 75%, are in a reserve status. Similar to a CERFP,
units within the HRF are pre-existing and maintain a dual mission status (i.e. the
HRF mission and the pre-existing mission). Finally, according to a Rand report
published in 2010 [1] two HRFs will consist of units sourced from multiple states’
National Guard units.
It is important to note that the establishment of CRE unit locations was not
implemented based on a holistic analysis of the entire structure that exists today.
The units were instituted and sited incrementally. While the DoD provided guidance
and oversight of locations, it appears that stationing decisions were primarily left
to the states’ direction. According to a press release from 2001 referencing WMD-
CST unit locations, “stationing decisions were made based upon criteria established
by the Department of the Army and provided to the states. Criteria were designed
to make the most of existing facilities and to ensure maximum coverage of the large
metropolitan areas in each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions”
[6]. There does not appear to be any information in the open source regarding CERFP
and HRF stationing, but it is likely that similar criteria were used. Delegating unit
location decisions to each subordinate state may have created inefficiencies in the
response capability of the CRE. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if these
inefficiencies exist and if so, find cost efficient modifications that can improve the
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coverage provided by the CRE.
2.3 Current CRE Strategic Guidance
There are several strategic documents that highlight the priority of CBRN conse-
quence management within the homeland defense context. Below is a brief summary
of these documents:
• 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: Developed at the behest of President
Obama to review and update the DoDs strategy and shape the direction for the
DoD over the next decade. Within this guidance, the President directed,“DoD
will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent
and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities” [13].
• 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review: The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
is a report to Congress, mandated by law, which outlines the DoDs strategy
and priorities. In the 2014 QDR, one of the three pillars for the DoD’s defense
strategy is to protect the homeland which specifically includes support to civil
authority [42].
• 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil
Authorities: The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to
Civil Authorities outlines the DoD’s priorities and objectives for homeland de-
fense. Two of the main objectives for the DoD included, “maintain preparedness
for domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) incidents and,
develop plans and procedures to ensure Defense Support of Civil Authorities
during complex catastrophes” [15]. The strategy also highlights an increased
expectation from the public for a rapid and effective response to a catastrophic
event from the federal government. It further recognizes the continued threat
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posed by terrorists that seek to strike the United States using WMD. To pro-
tect the nation from such an attack, it stipulates the CRE be a modular force
capable of providing both state and federal assets to respond to multiple CBRN
attacks simultaneously. The strategy concludes by noting that while reduced
budgets within the DoD have limited program expansions, investment in the
CBRN consequence management enterprise must remain a top priority [15].
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction: Defense Response
to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents
in the Homeland: CJCSI 3125.01C: This document outlines guidance from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the DoD response to domestic CBRN incidents.
Response is defined as “those actions necessary to save lives, protect property
and the environment, and meet basic human needs after a CBRN incident has
occurred” [11]. It directs the CBRN response to develop technical expertise
and specialized equipment to effectively fill capability gaps that exist at the
local and state level in response to a CBRN incident. The instructions also
highlight the roles and responsibilities within the DoD for CBRN consequence
management [11].
• DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: This
strategy primarily focuses on operations preventing an attack but does highlight
the need for the DoD to provide rapid assessments of WMD attacks to facilitate
future decisions [17].
2.4 CRE Doctrine
The current doctrine for the DoD’s response to a CBRN incident is governed by
Joint Publication 3-41: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence
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Management [35]. This publication describes the context of the CRE in the US gov-
ernment’s national response and provides an overview of the CRE at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. The US government’s national response is a three
tiered approach (i.e., local, state, and federal levels) based on the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF). The basic
premise of the strategy relies on an incident being handled by the lowest level until
it becomes apparent that the current assets will become overwhelmed if left unsup-
ported. The local response includes fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical
services. WMD-CSTs can be utilized within this tier if pre-positioned to respond to
an event but are normally considered a part of the state response. The state response
is initiated when local responders are unable to effectively manage the incident and
includes: state HAZMAT teams, state police units, state health department assets
as well as the WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs. The federal response is similarly
initiated when state resources are overwhelmed and may include some of the following
agencies: the Department of Energy radiation assessment teams, Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) emergency response assets, or Joint Task Force Civil
Support (JTF-CS) which manages the defense CBRN response force (DCRF) [55].
Developing an informative model for siting CRE unit locations requires an under-
standing of how the units are employed. A brief description of the National Guard
CRE response is outlined below based off doctrine from Joint Publication 3-41.
At the onset of an incident, the closest WMD-CST would respond to detect and
assess the impacts from a CBRN incident. A critical component of their assessment
is to determine the scale of the incident, the number of resulting casualties, and the
number of casualties in need of decontamination and medical treatment. This de-
termines the extent of additional CBRN consequence management forces that are
required. The assessment also “provides the necessary information to assist the in-
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cident commander in determining upwind and crosswind points and best locations
for search and extraction, decontamination, medical triage and emergency medical
services, and other sites” [35]. The WMD-CST communicates their assessments to
local authorities along with the National Guard Coordination Center (i.e., operation
center responsible for coordinating CRE state assets outside the affected state) and
USNORTHCOM, the combatant command responsible for the DCRF.
The next level of response comes from the CERFP. If the incident requires sig-
nificant decontamination, search and extraction, or medical triage, the supporting
CERFP for that state would arrive on scene within six hours of notification from
the Governor of the owning state. The CERFP’s initial deployment depends on the
evacuation process. If the process is controlled, the CERFP will move to reinforce
local responders at existing evacuation processing centers; otherwise they may need
to establish additional evacuation centers. The CERFP’s primary purpose is to “rein-
force evacuation centers to increase capacity and throughput or establish search and
extraction, decontamination, medical triage and emergency medical, expanding the
geographic distribution of response capability” [35].
The final level of response, if needed, comes from the HRF. A HRF responds with
additional search and extraction, medical treatment, and decontamination capabili-
ties. It also provides a security element to assist with controlling traffic flow into and
out of the incident site and a brigade headquarters to provide command and control
of the state CRE forces.
Overall, the CRE assists by providing additional capability to local response efforts
but also is “an important force multiplier by assisting with decontamination of local
fire, police, and emergency medical services personnel and equipment, thus helping
these immediate responders to stay safely engaged in the response” [35]. Figure 3
depicts the basic response to a CBRN incident.
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Figure 3. Layered Response Spectrum [35]
At the tactical level, WMD-CSTs are governed by National Guard Regulation
(NGR) 500-3 [55], and CERFPs are governed by National Guard Regulation 500-4
[54]. There is currently no individual doctrine for a HRF, but its basic requirements
are outlined in Joint Publication 3-41. The doctrine guiding the CRE was developed
as the force evolved and continues to be updated as assumptions are tested. This study
16
is only focused on the coverage a team can provide based on its geographic proximity
to potential incident sites and, therefore the remaining discussion of doctrine will
focus only on the required response times at each echelon of the CRE.
2.5 Doctrine: Response Time
Joint Publication 3-41 specifies response times for each of the units within the
National Guard component of the CRE. WMD-CSTs are required to respond within
three hours of notification, CERFPs within six hours of notification, and HRFs within
six to twelve hours of notification. It is important to note that notification comes at
the direction of the governor of the sourcing state and is not the same as the time the
incident occurs. The time between the incident and notification largely depends on
information available, communication flow, and the prerogative of the governor. The
Joint Publication also describes WMD-CSTs as arriving in the vicinity of the incident
site within the first six hours. It is not clear if this is a directive or presented to provide
a basic expectation for local responders. Additionally, there is no discussion regarding
the definition of vicinity. Outside of this description, there is not an explicitly stated
requirement in doctrine for the arrival of a CRE unit to the scene to an incident.
We can find, however, a previously used proximity requirement for WMD-CSTs
from a DoD commissioned study. The report, Before Disaster Strikes: Imperatives
for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities [1], prepared for the Secretary
of Defense in 2010, utilized a 250 mile coverage radius and five-hour response time
(i.e., 250 miles assuming a 50 mph travel speed) to assess the coverage provided by
the current stationing of WMD-CSTs. It is not clear how this maximum response
time was derived, but NGR 500-4 does state WMD-CSTs assume a speed of 50 miles
per hour when traveling to an incident site. Since this report was commissioned as
a part of an advisory panel to the Secretary of Defense and members of Congress,
17
it is reasonable to assume the report’s five hour response time for a WMD-CST is
the current guidance within the DoD. We can extend this to conclude that a location
is not covered by a WMD-CST if it is not located within five hours of a WMD-
CST. Even though it is unclear how this response time was established and therefore
may merit further analysis, to limit the scope of this research we will assume this
requirement to be accurate. An equivalent study regarding CERFPs and HRFs does
not exist. Therefore, the required response time for CERFPs and HRFs is estimated
from their notification timelines.
Whereas the doctrine is somewhat ambiguous when defining required response
times to the incident site, there is clearly a theme of rapid response throughout
the guiding publications. Joint Publication 3-41 describes the WMD-CST missions
as “rapid, and effective employment of reconnaissance capabilities... to provide as-
sessments on the effects in terms of casualties and medical treatment (detect and
monitor)” [35]. The arrival of additional forces is dependent on the assessment of
the WMD-CST; a delay to the WMD-CST arrival will delay the response of the
remainder of the CRE. Joint Publication 3-41 specifically states, “the initial assess-
ments conducted by NG WMD-CSTs or other federal assessment teams are critical in
providing DHS and other federal departments and agencies the necessary situational
awareness to make quick decisions regarding resource sharing and coordination” [35].
As pointed out by Joint Publication 3-41, these decisions are critical to minimizing
the impacts of a CBRN event and thus rapid response is directly tied to minimizing
human suffering and saving lives.
The 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authori-
ties also highlights the important of rapid response, stating,“response elements have
the highest probability to save lives within 72-96 hours after an incident” [15]. Dur-
ing this initial 72-96 hours, the amount of time CRE assets are able to support the
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incident site is directly correlated to the overall impact the CRE has on mitigating
the effects of the incident. The strategy goes on to state and succinctly summarizes
the intent of this analysis, “to address this time constraint, DoD will explore
force-sourcing options that include a unit’s proximity to the affected area”
[15]. The strategy continues, “Homeland defense and civil support missions require a
rapid response, often measured in hours, not days” [15]. The National Preparedness
Guidelines also emphasize rapid response, “...the ability to rapidly decontaminate
large numbers of affected persons is critical in preventing injury or death” [12]. Fi-
nally, this notion of rapid response was the emphasis behind restructuring the CRE
to leverage the more geographically dispersed National Guard.
Ensuring the National Guard component of the CRE can rapidly deploy is essential
to meet the objectives outlined by the governing strategy and doctrine. Thus, the on-
scene response time should be a significant requirement or, at the very least, should
be clearly understood. Based on the requirement for rapid response, this thesis will
argue that a location is only considered covered by a CRE element if it is within
sufficient proximity to to guarantee rapid deployment. This study will analyze the
current configuration of the CRE and how well it covers the population using this
notion of rapid response. This study will make an assumption about the definition
of rapid deployment based on current doctrine, but we also acknowledge there is
additional analysis needed outside the scope of this thesis to better define a rapid
response.
2.6 Previous Coverage Analysis
The current analysis on CRE coverage is limited, and most of the findings are
presented without a description of the methodology. For example, in the previously
discussed 2010 study, Abbot et al. [1] analyzed if the location and number of WMD-
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CSTs was sufficient. A location was described as covered if it fell within a 250-mile
coverage radius or a five hour response time of the closest WMD-CST. The study
claimed all of the United States’ most populated areas are adequately covered with
some risks accepted in western Texas. Unfortunately, the authors did not disclose
the exact methods of their analysis, and it is difficult to interpret their results. Some
key questions arise about their modeling assumptions, such as: what is the threshold
for being considered one of the United States’ most populated areas, was the 250-
mile distance calculated over road distance or straight line distance, and what defines
adequate coverage. Moreover, their study also only addressed WMD-CSTs with no
analysis of CERFPs or HRFs.
A second analysis of coverage is provided by the National Guard, which claims in
its 2013 annual posture statement that 80 percent of the US population lives within
250 miles of CRE state response forces [14]. In their 2015 posture statement, they
claim that 97% of Americans live within a five-hour response window of a National
Guard HRF or CERP [18]. It is important, again, to note the National Guard is
referencing a five-hour or 250-mile response window that was previously mentioned
in the RAND report but not specifically addressed in doctrine. This 2015 posture
statement also claims that WMD-CSTs can respond within 90-minutes of notification.
All of these statements are presented to reassure the public of the CREs capabilities.
As with the 2010 Abbot et al. [1] study, these claims are presented without providing
the methodology for their analysis so they are difficult to verify. As written, these
reports seem to highlight the best case components of the force which may uninten-
tionally provide an overly optimistic view of the true capabilities. A rigorous analysis
is needed to assess the validity of these claims and provide an assessment of the true
coverage of the force.
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2.7 Other CBRNE Response Enterprise Research
The remainder of the CRE research has occurred through Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) studies, advisory committees to senior DoD officials or members
of Congress, and theses submitted in partial fulfillment of a masters of arts degree re-
lating to the study of homeland security at DoD affiliated institutions. These reports
were predominately conducted utilizing qualitative research methods and examine
doctrine, training, and standards. Most also focus solely on one echelon of the CRE
without examining the entire structure. We present this material to further highlight
the importance of rapid response and, demonstrate the limited quantitative analysis
previously conducted. Additionally, given the recent inclusion of the HRF, there is
limited research that focuses on the entire CRE structure as it stands today.
2.8 Government Accountability Reports
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) provides oversight
of federal programs by advising Congress on how effectively federal funds are being
utilized. Their reports are supposed to be “objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-
ideological, fair, and balanced” [4]. The GAO has conducted three studies related to
the CRE: one in May of 2006 focused on WMD-CSTs [30], a second in 2009 focused on
the DoD’s federal CBRNE consequent management plans [32], and a third published
in 2011 focused on CERFPs [59].
The 2006 GAO report [30] examined the WMD-CSTs’ readiness to conduct mis-
sions in terms of training, equipment, and personnel on-hand as well as their admin-
istrative policies. The study found that, overall, WMD-CSTs were ready to assume
their mission and any significant issues identified in this report were addressed prior
to subsequent reports. The report also provided estimates for costs of establishing
WMD-CSTs ($7.7 million) and annual operating costs ($3.4 million) that are useful
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for development of model parameters in Chapter 4. There was, however, no quanti-
tative analysis of coverage based on the WMD-CST array of forces.
The 2009 GAO report [32] focused on the DoD’s plans and preparedness for CBRN
consequence management. This report identified “DOD’s ability to train and deploy
forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to response to multiple CBRNE
incidents is at risk” [32]. This report also highlighted a lacking defined requirement of
the capability the DoD was expected to respond with to a CBRN incident. At the time
of this report the CRE consisted of National Guard WMD-CSTs and CERFPS and
three federal CCMRFS, a much larger federal component than currently exists today.
The report highlighted the current structure of the CRE was found in internal DoD
analyses to leave a significant amount of time between local responders capabilities
being overwhelmed and federal assets arriving at the incident. It further identified
a reduction of response time was needed to fill this gap. Although not specifically
stated, it is likely these findings spurred the shift to a CRE structure more reliant on
the National Guard to reduce response time.
Finally, the 2011 GAO report [59] studied the readiness level of CERFPS, how
well they coordinate with potential incident partners, and their command and con-
trol framework. The study identified significant issues with personnel, training, and
equipment. The biggest problem was maintaining the required number of specially
trained personnel on hand to complete the mission. They also identified issues with
guidance on coordination between CERFPs and incident partners. Finally, issues
with the command and control structure were identified that mainly related to com-
munications equipment, out of state agreements, and lack of exercises that practice
command and control structure. The most pertinent finding related to the scope of
this study was an issue with recall times, the time it takes to assemble the unit at
its home location. A total of 13 of the 17 CERFPs surveyed in the study were not
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conducting exercises to determine how long a no-notice recall of their forces would ac-
tually take, mainly because they felt such experiences would create tensions between
employers and NG members and would adversely affect the unit. Without rehearsing
this key component, a recall will likely take longer than anticipated, increasing the
need for the unit’s physical location to be as close as possible to the incident site to
reduce response time [59].
2.9 Previous Theses
Each of the previously published theses examined a component of the CRE, pre-
dominantly the WMD-CST echelon. As stated before, all used qualitative research
methods and primarily studied the force compared to existing doctrine. We first ex-
amine four theses focused on the WMD-CST echelon and then one focused on the
HRF echelon.
2.10 WMD-CST
Early in the development of the response force, Besosa [24] analyzed the National
Guard’s role in responding to a Weapons of Mass Destruction attack in a research
report conducted at the Air Command and Staff College. He identified the need for
the development of doctrine to address WMD-CST certification process, expected
capabilities, and employment. The study did not specifically analyze the coverage
provided by WMD-CSTs but does highlight, “the states were selected after an objec-
tive analysis that places the teams closest to the greatest number of people, minimizes
response time within a geographical area, and reduces the overlap with other teams’
areas of responsibility” [24]. The source of this information comes from a DoD press
release, but the methodology for the study was not presented.
In 2002 Erichsen [37] evaluated how well the established WMD-CST structure and
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capabilities met the intent set forth in the initial DoD tiger team report, presidential
directives, and the 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. His
methodology developed metrics from these initial guiding documents and analyzed
the WMD-CST structure against previous and potential scenarios. It is important to
note this study occurred before a large percentage of teams were in place; however,
some of the issues identified still exist today. For example, the study highlighted
the importance of WMD-CSTs rapid response utilizing a vignette from the Tokyo
Subway Attack in 1995. Erichsen claims a similar Sarin gas attack could kill people
within minutes and spread miles over a short time span. The failure of a WMD-CST
team to rapidly detect this substance would lead to additional loss of lives. Erichsen
also identified issues with the stationing of WMD-CSTs and their travel distance to
potential incident sites. His analysis highlighted the large distance between the city
of Miami, Florida’s second largest city, and the closest WMD-CST. This distance has
decreased since Florida added a second WMD-CST but, even today with two WMD-
CSTs, the distance between Miami and the closest WMD-CST is still over 250 miles.
Given Florida has two WMD-CSTs, traveling over 250 miles to the second largest
city in the state appears sub-optimal. A quantitative analysis is needed to determine
if modifications to the WMD-CST structure can improve coverage.
Brown [25] also studied WMD-CSTs in 2004 to determine if they were properly
trained, equipped and structured to respond to a domestic CBRN incident. The study
had little substance and did not specifically analyze response time or coverage. He
did present the claim that the current structure covered 90% of the U.S. population,
within a 250-mile radius, although no citation was provided for this claim.
In a more recent study published in 2013, Giles [41] studied the current structure
of the WMD-CSTs versus a regional approach with one WMD-CST in each FEMA
region. These two structures were subjectively evaluated against doctrine using six
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key components: engaged partnership, tiered response, operational capabilities, unity
of command, readiness to act, and cost. The author estimated operating costs for
each WMD-CST based on annual personnel costs but did not include other costs
such as training and maintenance. Using this cost metric, Giles concluded the cost
of the larger structure is worth the value gained in the other key components. While
Giles provided a solid overview of the capabilities of the WMD-CST, there is limited
quantitative analysis of coverage other than identifying more teams provide better
coverage. An analysis of the population covered by each force structure in relation to
the cost would provide better insight.
2.11 HRFs
One of the few studies analyzing the HRFs and their capabilities was conducted
in 2011 [61]. The study focused on recommending standards for the HRFs through a
qualitative analysis using case studies of past CBRNE events and the Israeli CBRNE
force. The study recommended providing each HRF with advanced technologies,
establishing flexibility to respond to missions beyond CBRN events, and working
closely with supported states. The study does not discuss unit locations or response
time.
2.12 Call for Quantitative Analysis
In 2001 RAND conducted a study [48] to advise the Army on supporting the
homeland security mission. The objectives of the report were to: (1) characterize the
range of threats that need to be considered; (2) provide a methodology for homeland
security; (3) delineate Army responsibilities; (4) describe additional force protection
requirements that might be necessary; (5) evaluate capabilities, provide options, and
highlight risks; (6) help the Army explain its role in homeland security.
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This report recognized that the establishment of WMD-CSTs (and other newly
developed organizations) had improved the nation’s response capabilities, but there
had been limited analysis that ensured the most cost-effective structure was imple-
mented. The report argued that “more systematic...policy analyses that explore the
performance and cost of alternative architectures of federal, state, and local actors”
[48] are needed. The study also points out:
“...system seems to have been constructed with little attention to cost
and effectiveness and may have resulted in a system that has critical gaps
(in responsiveness, for example, or capacity), effectiveness shortfalls, or
unnecessary redundancies that only become apparent in an actual inci-
dent, and with potentially grave consequences. Far better to begin exer-
cising this system and to undertake the necessary analysis to understand
where, at the margin, investments and divestments should be made at the
local, state, and federal levels.” [48]
The report specifically called for analysis using simulation and optimization mod-
els to assist in understanding the optimal allocation of resources to minimize the
consequences of various threats. Furthermore, it pointed to the Army’s critical role
in this process stating, “the Army should seize the initiative and take a leadership role
in creating the necessary framework and supporting capabilities (databases, models,
etc.) for homeland security studies and analyses” [48]. This thesis applies these ideas
to improve the nation’s ability to respond to a significant CBRN incident in a cost
effective manner.
2.13 Facility Location Models
Currently, there is limited research focused on modeling optimal CRE unit loca-
tions. However, a similar problem, siting Emergency Response Services (ERS) such
as police departments and fire stations, is well studied. Some recent research also
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focuses on siting medical supply facilities for large scale emergencies. The following
section reviews previous modeling techniques with similar applications that informs
the development of the model in Chapter 3. We discuss the classification of facility
location models, review classical approaches, demonstrate specific applications, and
present previous solution techniques.
2.14 Facility Location Problem Taxonomy
We begin first with a brief overview of Daskin’s [34] taxonomy of facility location
problems:
• Topographic Characteristics: (1) Planar: Demands and facilities can occur any-
where on a plane, (2) Network: Demands and facilities can only occur on spec-
ified nodes and edges of a graph. (3) Discrete: Demands and facilities can only
occur on a discrete number of nodes on a graph.
• Facilities to locate: (1) Exogenously specified: The number of facilities to be
sited is dictated by influences outside the problem such as limited resources. (2)
Endogenous specified: The number of facilities to be sited is a model output.
• Public vs. private: Private models often measure cost and benefits in monetary
units. Public models often have goals that must be measured based on quality
of service. These models must provide maximum coverage of its supported pop-
ulation while operating with limited resources and without completely ignoring
a segment of the population.
• Capacitated vs. uncapacitated: The service capacity of the facility can be finite
or infinite.
• Static vs. dynamic: Are the inputs always the same or will they change with
time?
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• Probabilistic vs. deterministic: Are the inputs known or do they occur with a
certain probability?
• Single vs. multiple service: Do all the facilities provide the same type of service,
are there different types of service required for each demand?
• Single objective vs. multi-objective: Does the model seek to optimize one ob-
jective or are there competing objectives that must be balanced?
• Desirable vs undesirable: Desirable models often seek to place facilities close
to demands while undesirable models locate facilities as far from demands as
possible. Locating trash dumps can be thought of as a undesirable facility
location problem.
2.15 Classical Models
Often, the first step in facility location modeling is to define the objective function.
Four commonly used objective functions include: minimize average travel distance
(i.e., p-median problem), minimize the maximum distance to a customer (i.e., p-center
problem), minimize the number of facilities needed to cover all demands for a given
coverage radius (i.e., Set Covering Problem (SCP)), or maximize coverage of demands
given a coverage radius and set number of facilities (i.e., Maximal Covering Location
Problem (MCLP)). The following sections highlight these four different approaches
and some of the extensions that have been developed to adapt the formulation more
precisely to a given problem.
2.16 Set Covering Problem Approach
Siting emergency management facilities using a set covering problem (SCP) ap-
proach was first introduced by Toregas et al. [60]. The model seeks to find the
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minimum number of facilities required to cover each demand node. “A demand point
is treated as covered only if a facility, or a set of facilities, is available to provide the
required service to the demand point within a required distance or time” [51]. Their
initial model assumed the location of demand nodes and facility locations is finite,
the given response time between any node and possible facility location is known,
each facility has identical costs and a facility can be placed on a demand node. The
SCP formulation is presented below:
Sets
• M : The set, indexed by i, of demand nodes.
• N : The set, indexed by j, of potential facility locations.
Decision Variables
• yj: A binary decision variable equal to 1 if a facility is located at site j, 0
otherwise.
Parameters
• aij: A binary parameter equal to 1 if the distance from site i to facility j is
within a specified coverage radius, 0 otherwise.
Formulation:
Minimize
∑
j∈N
yj (2.1)
s. t.
∑
j∈N
aijyj ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈M, (2.2)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j ∈ N. (2.3)
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The objective (2.1) minimizes the number of facilities that are sited. Constraint
(2.2) requires every demand node be covered by at least one facility. Constraint (2.3)
restricts the decision variables to binary values.
The model can be extended to address instances when facility location costs are
not equal by adding a weight to each facility in the objective. The objective then
becomes to minimize cost rather than the number of facilities.
Establishing the coverage radius is the most critical and difficult component of
correctly formulating a SCP. The coverage radius can be defined in terms of distance
or time, and it is normally determined using the input of subject matter experts and
government regulations. The assumptions used to build the coverage radius determine
the validity of the model.
Kolesar and Walker [47] demonstrated a use of the SCP approach as a part of
their innovative model for relocating fire companies. In large urban cities when a
large volume of fires occur, the coverage provided by available fire companies may
be significantly reduced. To mitigate this effect, it is a common practice to relocate
fire companies to cover vulnerable parts of the city. Due to the frequency of fires in
New York City, coverage is constantly in flux and difficult to determine. Kolsear and
Walker sought to develop an algorithm that would assist dispatchers in determining
when and where coverage gaps existed and which available fire companies should
move to cover these gaps. A key component Kolsear and Walker’s work was ensuring
the algorithm recommend simple adjustments by generating the minimal moves nec-
essary to restore coverage. To accomplish this, the authors formulated and solved a
SCP model. Empty fire houses were the facility locations, and the uncovered neigh-
borhoods were demand nodes [47]. Using the SCP approach, the algorithm found
the minimum number of fire companies needed to cover all the uncovered demand
nodes. The next stage restricted relocations to this number and then assigned the spe-
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cific companies by minimizing travel distance such that currently covered demands
remained covered. The complete algorithm was compared to the current system
through a simulation which replicated one of the worst nights in terms of number of
fires, in the Bronx. In total the Bronx received 288 alarm calls, double the normal
amount for a day. The authors’ algorithm achieved a 10% increase in coverage of
neighborhoods compared to the relocation system that was used that night. As a re-
sult, New York City fully implemented the authors’ algorithm into their dispatching
process.
While the SCP approach is useful, it covers individual demands regardless of their
size or location [45]. Small, remote demands may disproportionally contribute to the
resources required to cover all demands and lead to solutions that exceed resource
limitations. For these instances, use of the SCP approach requires solving the problem
multiple times with differing coverage radii. This is done to highlight the trade-off
between cost and service provided.
2.17 MCLP Approach
To address situations when the SCP approach resulted in solutions that exceeded
resource limitations, Revelle and Church [27] developed the Maximal Covering Loca-
tion Problem (MCLP). The MCLP seeks to maximize coverage of a population within
a defined coverage radius given a set number of facilities [27]. This formulation unlike
the SCP takes into account the size and location of demands. Schilling et al. [58]
points out, that demand is required to be covered under the SCP, while coverage is
optimized under the MCLP. The MCLP approach, however, can leave demand nodes
uncovered. The MCLP formulation utilizes the same sets, decision variables and pa-
rameters as introduced in the previous formulation along with the following decision
variables and parameters:
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Decision Variables:
• zi: A binary decision variable equal to 1 if a demand node i is covered by at
least one facility, 0 otherwise.
Parameters:
• hi: The amount of demand at demand node i.
• dij: The distance from demand node i to facility j.
• r: The coverage radius.
• aij: A binary parameter equal to 1 if dij ≤ r, 0 otherwise.
• p: The number of facilities to be sited.
Formulation:
Maximize
∑
i∈M
hizi (2.4)
s. t.
∑
j∈N
aijyj ≥ zi, ∀ i ∈M, (2.5)
∑
j∈N
yj = p, (2.6)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j ∈ N, (2.7)
zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈M. (2.8)
The objective (2.4) maximizes the population covered within the specified coverage
radius. The first set of constraints (2.5) require at least one facility to be within the
coverage radius for the coverage decision variable zi to be set to 1. Constraint (2.6)
defines the number of facilities to be sited. The final constraints (2.7) and (2.8)
restrict the decision variables to binary values.
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The general form of the MCLP assumes that coverage is binary, i.e., a demand is
covered or not. Similar to the SCP, defining the coverage radius is a critical component
affecting the result. In the public sector, determining the number of facilities to site
is often dictated by the available resources. The MCLP can also be solved recursively
with different coverage radii and facilities to examine trade-offs of cost, coverage, and
service quality. Some of the problem’s applications and extensions are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
An extension of the MCLP developed by Daskin [33] is the Maximum Expected
Covering Location Problem (MECLP). The motivation for this extension was derived
from ambulance dispatching, where the closest ambulance may be on a call and not
available. This model’s objective function first seeks to minimize the number of
facilities sited and subsequently seeks to maximize dual coverage of demands. To
model this approach, the authors assumed that each facility has an identical and
independent probability p of being unavailable. For larger values of p, the best solution
resulted in locating all facilities at the node with the greatest demand. Gendreau et al.
[40] developed a similar double coverage model for ambulances wherein the objective
seeks to maximize the number of demand that is covered twice but does not include
the probability of coverage availability as apart of the model.
Another extension addresses the assumption of all-or-nothing coverage of the
MCLP. In the general form of the MCLP, a demand node is either covered or not.
Berman and Krass [23] identified that this all-or-nothing approach may not fully cap-
ture the true coverage provided by a facility. For example, consider a demand node
that exists one mile outside a coverage radius. While the optimal response time may
not have been achieved, the difference in response between this node and a covered
node can be minimal. This gradual change in coverage, however, is not captured uti-
lizing the classic MCLP Approach. The authors developed the generalized maximal
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covering location problem (GMCLP) “to provide a significant increase in modeling
flexibility beyond the standard MCLP” [22]. The coverage of a demand node is cap-
tured using a decreasing step function of the distance of the demand node to the
closest facility. This change in the definition of coverage allows for a more detailed
representation of coverage.
Pirkull and Schilling [56] also implement the idea of partial coverage into a ca-
pacitated MCLP model. They defined the model as the maximal covering location
problem with capacities on total workload [56]. They argued that, when siting ca-
pacitated facilities utilizing the MCLP approach, the demand nodes left uncovered
would still utilize facilities and contribute to the load placed on a facility. Without
a partial coverage function uncovered demands were arbitrarily assigned to facilities
with available capacity. This is likely not a practical solution since a demand will
generally be serviced by the closest facility. For example, consider an individual that
lives outside the coverage radius needs medical care. They are most likely to utilize
the closest hospital. Implementing a partial coverage function, facilities were sited
such that uncovered demands were still accounted against a facility’s available capac-
ity. This resulted in more accurately accounting for the impact of uncovered demand
on a facility’s capacity.
2.18 p-median Approach
The p-median approach was first developed by Hakimi [43]. This model seeks to
minimize the average distance traveled from a demand node to a facility over the
entire network by locating p facilities. Klose and Drexel [46] refer to this problem
as the minsum problem, as the objective seeks to minimize the sum of the distances
from each demand node to its closest facility. Berman [22] defines it as “the best
travel distance for an average customer”. The p-median formulation utilizes previ-
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ously introduced sets, decision variables, and parameters and is augmented with the
following additional decision variable:
Decision variables:
• xij : A binary decision variable equal to 1 if demand i is assigned to facility j,
0 otherwise.
Formulation:
min
∑
i∈M
∑
j∈N
dijxij (2.9)
s. t.
∑
j∈N
xij = 1, ∀ i ∈M, (2.10)
xij ≤ yj, ∀ i ∈M, j ∈ N, (2.11)∑
j∈N
yj = p, (2.12)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈M, j ∈ N, (2.13)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j ∈ N. (2.14)
The objective function (2.9) seeks to minimize the total distance of each unit to
the closest facility. Constraint (2.10) requires each unit be assigned to one facility.
Constraint (2.11) requires a facility to be located at site j if a demand is assigned
to site j. Constraint (2.12) restricts the number of facilities to equal p. Finally,
Constraints (2.13) and (2.14) are the binary restrictions.
The Army National Guard implemented the p-median approach as apart of their
mobile simulator implementation plan [52]. The objective of the plan was to minimize
the total travel distance for a set of mobile trainers. The authors utilized a decom-
position strategy, where the problem was broken down into stages and solved with
different models at each stage. The output from the previous model served as the
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input to the next model. The first stage of the process utilized a p-median approach
to select the home base for each mobile trainer. Demands were defined as unit loca-
tions in need of training and facilities were defined as potential home base locations
for the mobile trainers. Distances were weighted by the number of platoons at each
location that needed training. The result of this step found home base locations that
minimized the travel distance for the mobile trainers. The result of the full model
reduced the expected travel distance of the mobile trainers by 72,850 miles, which
requires about 70% fewer miles than the initial plan. The reduced travel resulted in
an estimated savings of over $8.6 million dollars a year or $123 million over the 20
year life of the system.
2.19 p-center Approach
The public sector commonly defines coverage of a population by the demand with
the lowest level of service. This type of coverage can be modeled using a p-center
approach, wherein the objective is to site p facilities that minimize the maximum
distance between a demand node and its closest facility. Klose and Drexel [46] define
this problem as a minmax problem since it seeks to minimize the maximum distance.
Finally, Berman [22] defines this approach as seeking to“optimize the travel distance
for the worst covered customer”. The p-center formulation utilizes previously intro-
duced sets, decision variables, and parameters and is augmented with the following
additional decision variables [46]:
Decision Variables:
• r: The maximum distance between a demand node and the closest facility.
• zij: A binary decision variable equal to 1 if demand node i is covered by facility
j, 0 otherwise.
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Formulation
Minimize r (2.15)
s.t. r −
∑
j∈N
dijzij ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈M, (2.16)
∑
j∈N
zij = 1, ∀ i ∈M, (2.17)
zij − yj ≤ 0, ∀ i ∈M, j ∈ N, (2.18)∑
j∈N
yj = p, (2.19)
zij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈M, j ∈ N, (2.20)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j ∈ N. (2.21)
The objective function (2.15) minimizes the maximum distance between a demand
and the closest facility. The first set of constraints (2.16) bound the value of r.
The second set of constraints (2.17) establish the facility that covers each demand.
Constraints (2.18) ensure that if a demand is covered by a facility at site j, a facility
exists at that location. The fourth set of constraints (2.19) set the number of facilities
to be sited. Finally, constraints (2.20) and (2.21) are the binary constraints.
2.20 Conditional Covering Problem
Moon and Chaudhry [50] introduced the conditional covering problem (CCP) as
a variant of the unweighted SCP. The CCP has the same objective as the SCP –to
establish the minimum number of facilities to cover all demands– but adds an addi-
tional constraint requiring each sited facility be covered by another facility. The CCP
formulation utilizes previously introduced sets, decision variables, and parameters
and is augmented with the following additional parameter:
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Parameters:
• bjk: A binary parameter equal to 1 if facility j is covered by facility k, 0 other-
wise, bkk = 0.
Formulation
Minimize
∑
j∈N
yj (2.22)
Subject to:
∑
j∈N
aijyj ≥ 1, ∀i ∈M, (2.23)
∑
k∈N
bjkyk ≥ yj, ∀j ∈M, (2.24)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N. (2.25)
The objective (2.22) sites the minimum number of facilities. The first set of
constraints (2.23) require every demand be covered by a facility. The second set
of constraints (2.24) require every facility be covered by another facility. The final
constraint (2.25) restricts the decision variable to binary values.
The CCP has few previous applications but, Lunday [49] introduced a special
case of the CCP, the modified covering problem (MCP), that specifically applies to
siting WMD-CST units. In the MCP, each facility has the same coverage radius,
facility costs are identical, facility locations are the same as the set of demand nodes,
and a facility cannot cover a co-located demand. Since WMD-CSTs are identical
units, assuming equal costs and coverage radius are reasonable assumptions. The
final constraint is included because “a terrorist biological or chemical attack on a
city may render its own team incapable of performing its mission” [49]. Preventing a
facility from covering a colocated demand identifies the coverage provided in a worst
case scenario.
The MCP is introduced with an identical formulation to the CCP model and the
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author then demonstrated that constraint (2.23) and constraint (2.24) can be satisfied
with the constraint below:
∑
j∈N
aijyj ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈ N, (ajj = 0). (2.26)
Constraint (2.26) still requires every demand node be covered, but, by setting
the diagonal of the A matrix to 0, a facility cannot cover itself. Since every located
facility exists on a demand node, each facility must be covered by another facility.
This formulation is well suited for our problem statement, and a variant of this model
is developed in Chapter 3.
2.21 Large Scale Emergencies
Jia et al. [45] developed models specifically designed for siting facilities that would
support a large scale emergency. They define large-scale emergencies as “those rare
events that overwhelm local emergency responders and require regional and/or na-
tional assistance, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks” [45]. They proceed
to highlight that large scale emergencies are unique in their low frequency and catas-
trophic effect on the population.
“The tremendous magnitude and low frequency of large-scale emergen-
cies require a modification in the definition of facility coverage to allow
for redundant facility placements and tiered facility services to ensure an
acceptable form of coverage of all demand areas when a large-scale emer-
gency occurs.” [45]
Their application focused on proactively locating medical stockpiles and reactively
siting distribution centers that would distribute medical supplies after a large scale
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emergency. Their model considered the number of facilities each demand point will
require and the service quality of each facility based on the distance a facility is located
from a supported demand node. The proactive facility location model, which shares
the most in common with CRE siting, involves deciding where to site the facilities and
the amount of supplies to stockpile at each location. They develop three objective
functions for different types of large scale emergencies while acknowledging that any
solution will still involve the loss of life. Because of this, Jia et al. emphasize “care
should be taken in prioritizing one solution over another” [45].
The model developed for proactive purposes uses an approach similar to the MCLP
with a slight change in the objective function. Instead of just weighting each demand
by population, they weight each demand based on the likelihood that a demand
point will suffer a large scale emergency of a particular type, the impact of that
scenario on the demand point, and the population at that demand. A demand with a
high probability of experiencing a scenario with a large potential impact and a large
population will be weighted highly, increasing the value to the objective function
attained by covering that node. Additionally, since there are different likelihoods
and effects for each scenario, there is potentially a different optimal solution for each
scenario. To find a global optimal solution they find the solution that minimizes
the sum of the difference of each scenario’s objective from its respective optimal
solution. The authors found their model improved dual coverage of demands over
classical models. Dual coverage is important in large scale emergencies because of the
potential for a facility to be destroyed during the emergency.
The authors also consider a p-median and p-center approach for reactive models.
Reactive models are designed to site distribution facilities after a large scale emergency
has occurred. The authors use this approach “based on the idea that the accessibility
and effectiveness of an EMS facility in response to an emergency situation will increase
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if the distance from the facility to the demand points decreases” [45]. The reactive
model is less related to the CRE model since CRE units must be sited prior to an
attack. It could, however, be useful for planning potential decontamination or triage
points for CRE units after arriving at an incident.
Murali et al. [51] also examined facility location for large scale emergencies. They
noted, “an important additional consideration when planning a response to a large-
scale emergency is that there is a large degree of uncertainty associated with the
location of the emergency and the number of people affected” [51]. They used an
MCLP extension as well to formulate a model for their problem. They adapted
Berman’s ideas from the GMCLP, where coverage is not binary but a decreasing step
function of the distance. The authors’ argued “the further away the facility is, the
smaller the fraction of the demand it can cover.” [51]. They also highlighted that it
is difficult to determine which medical facility a person will be able to utilize during
an event due to unknowns such as road damage. However, the authors argued the
likelihood of using a facility decreases as the distance increases. Thus, the further
away the facility is located from a demand, the less likely it will cover it. The
“objective is to maximize the percentage of the affected population that successfully
receives medication” [51]. The model also allows for demand to be split across multiple
facilities that may provide different coverage levels.
2.22 Multi-Objective Optimization
Real world problems are often comprised of multiple objectives that are negatively
correlated with each other; improving one objective is accomplished at the expense
of the other. As the facility location discipline has grown there is a recognition that
many facility location problems have multiple objectives [29]. The most common of
these problems balance maximizing capability while minimizing cost. While a multi-
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objective problem can be modeled using a single objective, Current [29] noted the
advantage of providing “the decision maker with a range of non-inferior siting config-
urations which demonstrate the inherent trade offs among the conflicting objectives”.
This set of solutions allows a decision maker to understand the range of alternatives
[28] and balance the trade-offs by applying their judgment and experience to select
an ‘optimal solution’ [29].
Within the context of the CRE, the competing objectives are to maximize coverage
while operating with a limited budget. Below we highlight some useful applications
that inform the model in Chapter 3.
A study of the Denver fire department was conducted by Plane et al. [57] in order
to maintain coverage while reducing costs. The key components of the study involved
how to quantify coverage, measure the current level of coverage, develop a model that
held the current level of coverage while minimizing cost, validate assumptions with
inputs from the firefighters and city officials, and consider political factors that may
impact the solution’s implementation. The authors formulated the problem as an SCP
using a hierarchical objective function. Their hierarchical approach worked by first
finding the minimum number of fire stations needed given a certain coverage criteria.
Coverage was determined based on response time since previous studies demonstrated
a positive correlation of response time and minimizing fire damage. The approach
subsequently maximized the number of existing fire stations, while keeping the total
number of fire stations equal to the solution found in the first step. This approach is
used to consider the economic and political costs of moving an existing fire station.
The authors encountered issues when the model pushed most of the fire stations to
boundaries of the city and failed to place enough coverage in the downtown area. To
account for this, they used the fire chief’s experience in siting the downtown stations
and held the downtown area locations as fixed. The authors resolved the problem
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and were again provided feedback by the firefighters regarding issues in the solution.
More adjustments to the model were made, and eventually a solution was found that
satisfied the firefighters and city officials. The study resulted in a savings of $2.6
million over six years and an annual savings of $1.2 million based on 1974 wages.
Daskin [34] introduced a similar model that locates facilities to achieve a coverage
level while maximizing the number of existing facilities that are a part of the solution.
His model is applicable to siting the CRE since the response enterprise is already sited
at existing locations. If the current configuration is not optimal, maximizing the use
of existing facilities will reduce the cost of adjusting the location of these units.
Additionally, “closing a [facility] that has served as a focus of community activity
and that provides a sense of security to residents may be difficult” [20]. A model that
does not drastically change the existing enterprise configuration is more likely to be
used by a decision maker.
Badri et al. [20] also developed a multi-objective model for locating fire stations
in support of the city of Dubai. This model assumed, “optimizing the location of
fire departments includes minimizing the sum of losses from fire and the cost of pro-
viding the service” [20]. The authors, however, acknowledged that an implementable
solution must also satisfy a number of other criteria. To find an optimal solution
that balances the many competing objectives, a multi-objective goal programming
model is developed. In preemptive goal programming, the objectives are ranked and
solved sequentially. Each objective is achieved to the greatest extent possible while
maintaining the previous objective. Ideally, these goals are ranked by the decision
maker. The authors provided the following rationale for using goal programming:
“...the decision to locate a fire station involves more than one govern-
ment agency. Each of these agencies has certain goals in mind that must
be satisfied. To add to the complexity of the situation, several decision-
makers from these agencies are present with different levels of authority.
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For example, those from the Civil Defense have more authority than their
counterparts from the municipality. In other words, the priority attached
to each of the goals is influenced by the type of government agency in-
volved as well as the position of the decision-maker within his own agency.
Given all these circumstances, goal programming could be the only tech-
nique suitable.”
The authors presented a model that incorporates eleven strategic objectives. Sev-
eral of their objectives include: (1) minimizing fixed costs and annual operating costs,
(2) maximizing service to those area that require it most, (3) minimizing average and
maximum distance from demand sites to the station, (4) minimizing average and
maximum time traveled, (5) siting the minimum number of fire stations, and (6) sit-
ing stations with minimum service overlap. Certain areas of the city where considered
more important based on an increased potential monetary loss from a fire. Minimizing
the maximum distance is added to the model as a worst case scenario. The average
distance from a station to a sub-area is used for normal conditions. Maximum time
to a sub-area is used to reflect road conditions and congestion. The authors also
introduced an idea of favored area status that could represent existing stations that
need to stay open. They also attempted to locate fire station along boundaries with
low fire rates.
The authors first formulated the problem as a set covering problem and analyzed
the number of fire stations needed for various maximum response times. This in-
formation was then used in their preemptive goal programming model which they
solved with multiple times varying the order priorities. The results of this analysis
were presented to the stakeholders to analyze the trade-offs amongst the different
priorities and costs.
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2.23 Multiple-Service Model
Belardo et al. [21] present a model quite different from the models previously
analyzed along with a much different application. Their model is framed around sit-
ing response resources for a major maritime oil spill. Oil spills can have a dramatic
impact on the environment and economy of an affected region, and strategically siting
resources that assist in mitigating the impacts of the oil spill is critical. They iden-
tified several requirements for siting these resources. First, there are characteristics
of a spill that affect the type of required response that are independent of location.
For example, different types of oil require different types of equipment to clean. Thus
coverage requirements are dependent on being covered by multiple capabilities. They
also identified that spill probabilities vary by location much the way the probability
of a CBRN event is location dependent. Predicting the probability of an oil spill
is extremely difficult given how infrequently they occur. To address this issue, they
use conditional probabilities that are easier to estimate. For example, given a spill
occurred, what is the probability it occurred in a certain city? A similar methodology
could be used to estimate the likelihood of a CBRN event taking place in different
cities. In this article, the conditional probability associated with each city is deter-
mined by the volume of oil transferred and the number of ships traversing through
the region. Finally, their model considers different factors such as economic and envi-
ronmental impact. They solved the problem multiple times, trying to minimize with
respect to each consideration. The multiple solutions were then presented to the de-
cision maker, which allowed them to make the decision based on how they prioritized
the considerations [21].
Moore and Revelle [38] define a nested hierarchical maximal covering problem.
The objective of this model is to maximize coverage given constraints on the number
and type of facility locations or total investments in all facility types. The model al-
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lows for different coverage distances for each type of facility and different requirements
on what defines a node as covered.
2.24 Formulation
As demonstrated by Jia [45] a p-center, p-median, and covering model all can be
implemented for modeling the response to a large-scale emergency. For the models
developed in Chapter 3, we implement extensions of the MCLP and SCP. p-median
and p-center approaches are more applicable to siting facilities that have a much
more frequent demand. Since CBRN events are much more infrequent, small gains
in response time have less impact on coverage. Additionally, these approaches do not
capture the increased importance of cities with larger populations since they are more
likely to be attacked. A more useful approach is to maximize the population covered
within a desired response time using a MCLP approach. To balance the trade-off
of cost and coverage, we will develop a set of non-inferior solutions that identify the
range of alternatives to a decision maker. Additionally, we can identify the required
number of units at each echelon needed to achieve full coverage using a SCP approach.
These models will be further developed in Chapter 3.
2.25 Floyd’s Algorithm
Coverage in Chapter 3 and 4 will be based on the distance between a CRE unit
and a demand. It is important this distance represents the shortest path between
these two nodes. Given a connected network we can find the shortest path between
any two nodes in a network using Floyd’s Algorithm [39]. Floyd’s algorithm guaran-
tees finding the shortest path between all pairs of nodes on a network but does not
detail the route used for the shortest path. The algorithm is detailed as follows:
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Data: input Distance Matrix D with n nodes
for k = 1 to n do
for i= 1 to n do
for j=1 to n do
D(i, j) = min(D(i, j), D(i, k) +D(k, j));
end
end
end
Result: Output D which contains the shortest path from any node i to any
node j.
Algorithm 1: Floyd’s Algorithm
This algorithm is implemented in Chapter 4 to find the shortest path between
each county in the Continental United States.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter develops the methodology for analyzing the impact CRE unit lo-
cations have on rapid response. We review the objective, approaches, modeling as-
sumptions, model formulations, and discuss the use of existing data to develop model
parameters.
3.2 Scope
The purpose of this analysis is to provide insight into CRE unit locations. We first
will evaluate the current structure and then identify alternative structures that may
improve the response capability of the CRE. We focus specifically on structures that
maximize coverage provided by the initial response of WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and
HRFs while minimizing change to the current structure. Initial response constitutes
the closest team at each echelon that would respond to a CBRN incident. Follow-
on response is not modeled because of the additional time available to respond and
the possible use of air assets, both of which largely negate the importance of unit
location. Finally, the WMD-CST response is treated as the most critical of the three
echelons since an assessment from a WMD-CST will dictate whether additional assets
are required. For this reason WMD-CSTs are analyzed both separately and as a part
of the whole CRE structure.
3.3 Approach
We develop a multi-objective multi-service extension of the MCLP which seeks to
maximize coverage of the population within a defined coverage radius while minimiz-
ing the cost of modifications. The multi-service component of the problem requires a
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demand to be covered by each echelon of the CRE, a WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF.
To account for multi-objective nature of this problem we develop a set of non-inferior
solutions using the -constraint method. This method involves iterating the bound on
the number of relocations allowed and maximizing coverage at each iteration. By it-
erating from 0 relocations to the existing number of teams we develop the entire range
of alternatives. This provides insight into the trade-off between coverage and cost of
CRE structure modifications. We also develop a SCP Model to find the minimum
number of facilities needed to cover the entire population given a specified coverage
radius. This is utilized to assess how many additional units are need to attain full
coverage given an existing structure.
3.4 Model Assumptions
Both models share common assumptions that fall into two main categories: (1)
assumptions the translate the real world system to a mathematical model and (2)
assumptions about the future of the CRE structure.
First, we limit the possible facility locations and demands to a finite set of nodes
on a network. These nodes represent population centers for each county in the con-
tinental United States. Limiting the solution space reduces the complexity of the
problem and frames the model around the existing US road network. Open source
data from government agencies provides a realistic indication of distances between all
nodes. Furthermore, we assume to know the time it takes to traverse between nodes
in the network based on the road distance and an assumed rate of travel and that the
rate of travel is deterministic.
Next, we assume that the probability of a CBRN incident occurring at a given
location is positively correlated with the location’s respective population. Thus a
greater demand is generated at a more populated node. Resource limitations prevent
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establishing enough units to provide full coverage, and therefore coverage is prioritized
by the level of demand. Given the importance of rapid response, coverage is considered
binary and a demand must be within a specified distance of a unit to be considered
covered.
Given the scope of destruction that can occur in a CBRN attack, it is possible a
demand will neutralize a CRE unit’s capabilities. Thus, in a pessimistic scenario, we
assume a unit located within a certain radius of a CBRN incident will be unable to
effectively respond to that incident. Coverage of the incident site will be determined
by the closest unit located outside of this radius. To highlight this risk associated
with a pessimistic scenario we introduce a minimum standoff distance that a unit
must be from a demand to provide coverage. We also assume the population size
at the demand is positively correlated with the risk to a CRE unit. Thus, a greater
population at a CRE unit’s location correlates to an increased probability of a CRBN
event neutralizing a CRE unit’s capabilities. In Chapter 4 the population colocated
with CRE units is used as a measure of risk for the entire CRE structure. Finally,
we assume that the probability of multiple simultaneous or near-simultaneous CBRN
events is low and will present infrequent demand. Thus, we model the facilities as
uncapacitated.
The remaining assumptions relate to the CRE structure. First, the effectiveness of
each WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF is assumed to be identical and sufficient. Next,
we restrict the number of WMD-CSTs, HRFs, and CERFPs to the current number
in the existing enterprise. Furthermore, it is assumed each state will continue to host
at least one WMD-CST. This is based on the presumed political cost of removing
an existing capability from a state. For example, in 2013 the DoD proposed dises-
tablishing the 24th WMD-CST located in New York and 48th WMD-CST located in
Florida. A number of Senators and Congressman from both states including House
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Appropriations Defense Subcommittee Chairman Congressman Bill Young (FL), Sub-
committee Member Congressman Bill Owens (NY), and Congressman Michael Grimm
(NY) fought the proposal and were able to convince the Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel to reverse the decision [2] [3].
The formulation of this problem also assumes that a WMD-CST can cover a loca-
tion outside the state in which it is located. Many states have inter-state agreements
already established to share CBRN resources. Additionally, WMD-CSTs can be used
to support other states via coordination through the National Guard Bureau, or they
can be federalized to respond to an attack anywhere in the United States if approved
by the appropriate authority. The importance of this assumption is demonstrated in
Chapter 4.
We also assume that a state will not host both a HRF and a CERFP. Most states
are facing challenges meeting the minimum manning requirements for the existing
CERFPs. Fielding a HRF in addition to a CERFP would only exacerbate a state’s
personnel challenges [31]. Additionally, funding training events or activations for
real world incidents for both of these units would significantly strain a state’s fiscal
resources. There must be a roughly equitable allocation of resources from each state
to the combined HRF and CERFP-levels of the CRE across the states.
Given these assumptions we now present the formulation of our model.
3.5 MCLP Model
Our model adopts an MCLP objective where it seeks to cover the maximum
number of people within a rapid response window given a fixed number of WMD-
CSTs, CERFPS, and HRFs. In order for a demand to be considered covered it
must be located within a maximum distance of at least one team at each echelon.
Additionally, to account for the risk of being collocated with an incident, a team
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will have a minimum stand-off distance it needs to be from a demand to provide
coverage, similar to the MCP. The MCLP model will be applied with and without the
minimum stand-off distance in Chapter 4 to highlight risk in a pessimistic scenario and
demonstrate the necessity to incorporate this concept into future planning. Finally, to
minimize the change to the current structure, we introduce a constraint that bounds
the number of relocations that can occur. When no relocations are allowed, the
model returns the coverage provided by the current structure. When the maximum
number of relocations are allowed, the solution returned is unaffected by the current
structure. Since Washington D.C. only has one location in this network and each state
must have one WMD-CST, the maximum number of relocations for WMD-CSTs is
one less than the total number of teams. Solving the model with the number of
allowable relocations increasing from 0 to the total number of teams produces a set of
non-inferior solutions that will demonstrate the trade-off between coverage and cost.
The sets, decision variables, parameters, and formulation for our model are presented
below:
3.5.1 Sets.
• G = (N,A): The underlying network.
• N : Set of nodes (indexed by j) in the network that represent possible facility
locations and demands.
• A : Set of undirected arcs (i, j) in the network, i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
• D : Set of demand nodes (indexed by i) in the network, D ⊆ N .
• S : Set of states s = 1, ..., 49, representing the 48 continental states and Wash-
ington D.C..
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• Ns ⊂ N Set of nodes located in state s, s ∈ S.
• R : Set of FEMA regions r = 1, ..., 10.
• Fr ⊂ N Set of nodes located in FEMA region r, r ∈ R.
• L = {w, c, h} : The set of CRE echelons indexed by `, where the indices corre-
spond to the WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF echelons, respectively.
3.5.2 Decision Variables.
This model contains two linked decisions: where to site facilities at each echelon
and which demands to cover.
• y`j : A binary decision variable equal to 1 if a facility at echelon level ` is located
at site j, 0 otherwise, ∀ ` ∈ L, j ∈ N.
• zi : A binary decision variable equal to 1 if demand at node i is covered by a
facility at each echelon level, 0 otherwise, ∀ i ∈ D.
3.5.3 Parameters.
• hi : Demand associated with node i, ∀ i ∈ D.
• dij : Distance from demand node i to facility j, ∀ i ∈ D, j ∈ N .
• r`min : Minimum stand-off distance at echelon `.
• r`max : Maximum coverage radius at echelon `.
• a`ij : A binary parameter equal to 1 if r`min ≤ dij ≤ r`max, 0 otherwise, ∀ j ∈ N ,
i ∈ D.
• ψ`j : A binary parameter equal to 1 if a facility at echelon level ` currently exists
at site j, 0 otherwise ∀ j ∈ N.
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• p` : The number of facilities at echelon `, that must be sited, ∀ ` ∈ L.
• q` : The minimum number of current unit locations at echelon ` that must be
maintained, ∀ ` ∈ L.
3.5.4 Model Formulation.
max
∑
i∈D
hizi (3.1)
subject to
∑
j∈N
a`ijy
`
j ≥ zi, ∀ ` ∈ L, i ∈ D, (3.2)
∑
j∈Ns
ywj ≥ 1, ∀ s ∈ S, (3.3)
∑
j∈Ns
ycj +
∑
j∈Ns
yhj ≤ 1, ∀ s ∈ S, (3.4)
∑
j∈Fr
yhj ≤ 1, ∀ r ∈ R, (3.5)
∑
j∈N
y`j = p
`, ∀ ` ∈ L, (3.6)
∑
j∈N
ψ`jy
`
j ≥ q`, ∀ ` ∈ L, (3.7)
y`j, ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ ` ∈ L, j ∈ N, (3.8)
zi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ i ∈ D. (3.9)
The objective function (3.1) seeks to maximize the total demand covered. The
decision variable zi is bounded by Constraint (3.2) and only equals 1, meaning demand
i is covered, if at least one facility (i.e., among y`j, ∀ j ∈ N) at each echelon is able to
cover i. Constraint (3.3) requires each state to have one WMD-CST, and Constraint
(3.4) prevents a state from having more than one CERFP and/or HRF. Assuring that
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one HRF is aligned with each FEMA region is accomplished via Constraint (3.5). The
number of WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF facilities to be sited is set by Constraint
(3.6). Constraint (3.7) requires at least q` facilities from the current unit locations at
echelon ` be maintained. Finally, Constraint (3.8) and (3.9) represent binary logical
constraints for the decision variables.
Incorporating the minimum stand-off distance is accomplished in a manner similar
to the method described by Lunday [49] in Chapter 3. We set the parameter ajj = 0
as Lunday described but also set any aij = 0 if the corresponding dij is less than
or equal to the minimum stand off distance. Defining this constraint through the
parameter simplifies solving the model in Chapter 4.
3.6 Set Covering Model
The Set Covering Model provides a different look at the problem and finds the
minimum number of additional teams needed to achieve full coverage. To account
for the coverage provided by the existing structure we reduce the demands to nodes
that are uncovered by the existing structure. Our SCP model then finds the minimum
number of units needed to cover these uncovered demands. Coverage requirements are
determined in the same manner as the MCLP model. The SCP utilizes the same sets,
decision variables, and parameters from the MCLP model along with one additional
set listed below.
3.6.1 Sets.
• U : Set of demand nodes uncovered by a current solution y¯.
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3.6.2 Model Formulation.
min
∑
`∈L
∑
j∈N
y`j (3.10)
subject to
∑
j∈N
a`ijy
`
j ≥ 1, ∀ l ∈ L, ∀ i ∈ U, (3.11)
ylj, ∈ {0, 1} , ∀ j ∈ N, (3.12)
The objective function (3.10) seeks to minimize the number of facilities needed in
order to cover each demand, given a specified coverage radius. Constraint (3.11)
requires each demand node to be covered by at least one facility, at each echelon.
Finally, Constraint (3.12) defines binary logical constraints for the decision variables.
3.7 Parameter Development
• hi : Population of each county was determined from the 2010 Census.
• dij : Distance between counties comes from the Center for Transportation Anal-
ysis Oak Ridge National Highway Network (NHN).
“The Oak Ridge National Highway Network is a geographically
based analytic network of the major highways in the United States. It
was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to support analyses
of a wide variety of highway transportation issues that require use of
a network. It presently contains approximately 500,000 centerline
miles of roadway and will, with varying degrees of accuracy, show the
location of these roads and attribute detail about their characteristics.
Although it includes many roads of lower class, it may be thought
of fundamentally as an arterial network. The ultimate intent is to
represent all rural arterials and most urban principal arterials, but
not collectors or urban minor arterials unless they are part of through
highways.” [9]
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Using this network we apply Floyd’s algorithm to determine the shortest path
between each node.
• r`max : The maximum coverage radius comes from existing doctrine and accepted
standards within the DoD. Distance is converted to time using a 50 mile per
hour response speed. WMD-CST were evaluated against a five hour response
window which translates to a maximum distance of 250 miles. CERFPs have a
six hour response requirement which translates to a 300 mile maximum coverage
distance. Finally, HRFs have a 12 hour response requirement which translates
to a 600 mile maximum coverage radius.
rwmax : 250
rcmax : 300
rhmax : 600
• r`min : The minimum stand-off distance is developed based on projected impacts
from a 10 kiloton nuclear device. This is the most deadly of the 15 scenarios
defined in the National Preparedness Guidelines [12] and is also the event for
which the CRE can have the greatest impact. Planning guidance from the
Federal Inter agency Committee Led by the Executive Office of the President
[10] highlights a 10 kiloton device as the most likely nuclear device that would
be used in a domestic terror attack. The significant damage from this device
is estimated to occur within a three-mile radius, and the deadly fallout radius
is estimated to extend for 10-20 miles. Given this information, we define a
conservative minimum standoff distance to be 25 miles.
rwmin : 25
rcmin : 25
rhmin : 25
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IV. Implementation and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present an evaluation of the current CRE structure and identi-
fication of efficient modifications that can improve the coverage capability. We apply
two scenarios to conduct this evaluation. The first scenario analyzes the structure
in terms of the current coverage definition that is drawn from doctrine and DoD
guidance. The second scenario accounts for the risk that exists if a CBRN incident
neutralizes the capability of any CRE units within a specified distance of a targeted
location. Additionally, we present an analysis of both the WMD-CST structure only,
and the CRE in its entirety. The WMD-CST structure is worthy of a separate anal-
ysis because rapid response by CERFPs and HRFs depends on information from a
WMD-CST, the first echelon to respond within the CRE. Additionally, the WMD-
CST model requires fewer modeling assumptions which leads to a more accurate
estimation of coverage.
4.2 Scenario Development
There is no current DoD guidance or doctrine that addresses planning for, or
considering, the destruction of a CRE unit’s capability due to a CRBN incident.
Through the analysis of this second scenario we intend to represent the risk to CRE
assets by a CBRN attack and thus the necessity to account for this risk into the future
CRE structure decisions. Each scenario is explicitly defined as follows.
• Baseline Scenario: A CBRN incident does not impact any of the CRE units.
Coverage is defined based on current doctrinal standards. The coverage radius
for each team is below:
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– WMD-CST coverage radius : 0 to 250 miles
– CERFP coverage radius : 0 to 300 miles
– HRF coverage radius : 0 to 600 miles
• Pessimistic Scenario: A CBRN incident will destroy the capability of any CRE
unit located within a specified distance, and CRE coverage is reliant upon the
closest unit outside this minimum stand-off distance. The updated coverage
radius for each echelon is below.
– WMD-CST coverage radius : 25 to 250 miles
– CERFP coverage radius : 25 to 300 miles
– HRF coverage radius : 25 to 600 miles
These two scenarios will highlight the level of coverage of the current structure
and risk that may exist.
4.3 Data Sources and Assumptions
We obtained the data used in this analysis from unclassified open-source resources;
it provides an approximation of the true system but is not an exact representation.
The road infrastructure network [9] utilized consists of 3109 nodes that represent
the population cores for counties in the Continental United States and the District
of Columbia. The arc length between nodes is determined using US highway road
distance. Population estimates for each county are taken from the 2010 US Census
and are geographically represented in Figure 4. Counties were classified by the CDC’s
2013 NCHS UrbanRural Classification Scheme for Counties [16]. CRE unit locations
[7] are estimated to exist at the population center of each county in which they are
based and do not depict their precise locations. We further assume the road network
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data is current, and that CRE elements will traverse the network unimpeded at an
average rate of speed of 50 mph.
Figure 4. US Population by Counties [8]
4.4 Optimal Solutions
Solutions were found on a PC with an Intel Xeon Processor E5-1620 and 32 GB
of memory using the commercial solver CPLEX (Version 12.6) [44] called through
Matlab. All solutions reported are within at least a relative optimality tolerance of
0.49%. This tolerance was instituted to prevent excessive run times that occurred
when running the model using the Pessimistic Scenario, which included the CCP
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constraint. The CCP is a NP-Hard problem and certain instances were not solvable
to optimality given the computing resources available.
4.5 Evaluation of Solutions
In our analysis we consider two additional measures outside the two objectives,
maximizing population covered and minimizing cost of modifications, of our model
formulation. These measures are not objectives of our formulation but will be used to
demonstrate the value of incorporating the Pessimistic Scenario into future planning.
First, we use the population colocated with each CRE unit as a measure of the risk.
Since we are assuming the probability of a CBRN event in a county is correlated
to the population of that county, the population size colocated with a CRE unit
represents the risk of an attack at a CRE unit’s location. Thus, the risk of a CRE
unit’s capabilities being neutralized by a CRBN event are correlated with the size of
the colocated population. Finally, to assess redundancy of coverage, we evaluate the
percentage of the population that is covered by more than one team,“double covered”.
4.6 WMD-CST Coverage
4.6.0.1 Support Across State Boundaries.
The following section reviews the assumption about coverage across state bound-
aries using the Baseline Scenario. We conduct this examination to demonstrate the
significant reduction in coverage that results from a myopic view of providing cov-
erage from only internal state assets, and thus the necessity of a holistic, enterprise
approach.
Assuming WMD-CSTs can only provide coverage inside their respective state,
results in approximately 285 million people or 93% of the population being covered,
as depicted in Figure 5. In Figure 5 covered counties are highlighted in green.
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Figure 5. Coverage provided by WMD-CSTs with coverage limited to within state
boundaries
Removing this restriction and allowing teams to cover locations outside the states
in which they are based improves coverage by over 8 million people to approximately
294 million or 95.88% of the population. Additionally, the total number of uncovered
counties reduces from 473 in the absence of coordination between states for WMD-
CST response with no support occurring across State Boundaries to 230 with it. This
increase in coverage demonstrates the necessity for states to share resources in order
to better protect the American population. For the remainder of this study we assume
CRE assets can support counties across state boundaries. We similarly assume that
HRFs can support counties across FEMA boundaries.
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4.6.1 WMD-CST Baseline Scenario.
4.6.1.1 Baseline Coverage: Current Unit Locations.
As mentioned in the previous section, the current structure covers 294 million or
95% of the population, as depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6. WMD-CST Current Coverage Baseline Scenario
Additionally, only 28 of the 230 uncovered counties have populations above 50,000,
and of those 28, only 8 have populations above 250,000. The two largest uncovered
counties are located in southern Florida, where more than four million people are
not covered in Boward and Miami-Dade County. This is especially interesting given
that Florida already has two WMD-CSTs. Outside of southern Florida the current
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structure using the existing definition of coverage covers the most likely targets of a
CBRN attack quite well.
4.6.1.2 Baseline Coverage: Optimal Unit Locations.
Since the current structure does not provide full coverage, an analysis of an optimal
structure using the current number of WMD-CSTs will provide insight into the quality
of the current structure. The optimal structure is defined to maximize coverage of
the population using the existing number of WMD-CSTs with at least one team
located in each state. Using our model we are able to increase coverage to over 306
million people or 99.99% of the population, as depicted in Figure 7. This optimal
structure, which requires 25 WMD-CST relocations, leaves only five counties, each
with a population under 10,000, uncovered.
It is interesting to note that every county in Florida and New York, states that
both currently have two WMD-CSTs, could be covered with only one team based
within their respective state boundaries using this optimal structure. While all mod-
ifications in this solution may not be feasible due to other considerations (e.g., the
availability of federal facilities at a proposed WMD-CST location), it demonstrates
that improvements exist for the current structure.
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Figure 7. WMD-CST Optimal Locations Baseline Scenario
4.6.2 WMD-CST Pessimistic Scenario.
We now analyze the Pessimistic Scenario wherein a WMD-CST must be located
outside the minimum stand-off distance to provide coverage for a county. This added
constraint highlights areas, at which WMD-CSTs are located in close proximity, that
are at risk of being uncovered if any CRE unit within the minimum stand-off distance
was rendered ineffective by a CBRN attack. The minimum stand-off distance was
developed based on projected impacts from a nuclear device detonation and estimated
to be 25 miles. The maximum coverage radius remains at 250 miles as in the previous
Scenario.
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4.6.2.1 Pessimistic Coverage: Current Unit Locations.
With this additional constraint, coverage by the current WMD-CST structure
drops to 278 million people or approximately 90.93% of the US population, as depicted
in Figure 8. This means approximately 5% of the population is at risk of being
uncovered if WMD-CSTs located within the 25 mile minimum stand-off distance are
rendered non-functional by a CBRN incident.
Figure 8. WMD-CST Current Coverage Pessimistic Scenario
This is particularly significant because the change in coverage exists primarily in
densely populated areas. Five additional counties with a population greater than
1 million and seven counties with a population greater than 250,000 people are, in
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this scenario, uncovered. These uncovered counties include major cities such as Los
Angeles, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Oklahoma City, and Austin, each of which is a realistic
target for a terrorist attack.
4.6.2.2 Pessimistic Coverage: Optimal Unit Locations.
It is clear that this additional coverage constraint reduces coverage capability
significantly. As with the baseline analysis, we compare the current unit locations
to an optimal structure to determine how much the structure could improve. This
optimal structure again uses the current WMD-CSTs and requires at least one team
to be located in each state. The optimal structure covers over 306 million people or
99.89% of the population with 50 relocations, as depicted in Figure 9.
While the current coverage in terms of the Pessimistic Scenario highlights signifi-
cant shortfalls in coverage, the optimal structure demonstrates it is possible to cover
a significant portion of the country with the current number of assets. Additionally,
the optimal structure covers all counties with populations greater than 50,000.
Note that the optimal solution for the Baseline Scenario yields only a 0.1% im-
provement in the population covered when compared to the optimal solution for the
Pessimistic Scenario. The advantage of applying the Pessimistic Scenario to site
WMD-CSTs is it reduces the risk to WMD-CSTs by moving them to less populated
locations. Without the standoff restriction, the optimal set of WMD-CSTs were colo-
cated with a population of approximately 15 million and with the standoff restriction,
the colocated population reduces to approximately 10 million. If we assume the risk
of an attack is correlated with the population of the city, then the minimum standoff
model significantly reduces the risk to the total WMD-CST enterprise. Additionally,
the percentage of the population that is “double covered” increases from 60% to 65%
using the Pessimistic Scenario. The comparison of optimal solutions from the two
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scenarios demonstrates the value of incorporating the Pessimistic Scenario into fu-
ture planning because it reduces the risk of attack to WMD-CSTs while covering a
significant portion of the population.
Figure 9. WMD-CST Optimal Locations Pessimistic Scenario
4.6.3 WMD-CST Relocation Trade-Off.
Given that the WMD-CST structure already exists, any modification to the struc-
ture will incur costs. Thus, moving a significant portion of the force is likely not a
viable option. To identify the trade-off between coverage gained and relocation costs,
we vary the number of teams that must remain in their current location from 0 to 51
(the Washington DC team only has one possible location) and resolve the model for
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each instance and each scenario. Figure 9 represents the percent of the population
that can be covered by WMD-CSTs for both the Baseline and Pessimistic Scenarios
as the allowed number of relocations from the existing structure increases.
Figure 10. Percentage of the population covered as allowed number of relocations
increases
For more than 32 allowed relocations, the coverage for each model sees no improve-
ment. Furthermore, after 11 allowed relocations coverage in both scenarios exceeds
99%. This significant gain in coverage can by achieved with less than a 20% modifica-
tion to the current structure. In Figure 11 we further highlight the marginal increase
for each additional relocation.
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Figure 11. Increase in number of people covered per additional allowed WMD-CST
relocation
4.6.4 Sensitivity on Coverage Parameters.
Within the Pessimistic Scenario, both the minimum stand-off distance and the
maximum coverage radius impact the coverage provided by the CRE. Since both are
estimates, an investigation into the impact these parameters have on the solution
is warranted. We apply Response Surface Methodology (RSM) to examine this im-
pact. Since we are only concerned with minimum stand-off distance and maximum
coverage radius, we choose to hold all other model inputs constant. To accomplish
this, we hold all WMD-CSTs at their current locations and consider the Pessimistic
Scenario. Current WMD-CSTs locations are used because changes to the system are
largely based off of this initial assessment. For example, if coverage is above a cer-
tain threshold we have no interest in changes to the structure and further analysis is
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unwarranted.
Selection of a design for a response surface involves many considerations. First,
we must determine the budget for experiments. The model is deterministic, and thus
there is no need for replication. Additionally, given that the objective function value
is now a function of minimum stand-off distance and the maximum coverage radius
only, the computation of coverage is trivial. This facilitates the use of a large number
of runs with little computational time, and thus we are not constrained by a run limit.
Next we determine the region for experimentation. We decide to center our design
region on the settings used in the previous analysis: a minimum stand-off distance
at 25 miles and a maximum coverage radius at 250 miles. We are interested in
examining a large area of the response surface and choose to set the limits for the
minimum stand-off distance ± 25 miles from the design center and ±50 miles from
the design center for the maximum coverage radius. The design region is highlighted
in Table 1:
Table 1. Coded Design Variables
Coded Value Minimum Stand-off Distance Maximum Coverage Radius
-1 0 200
0 25 250
1 50 300
Since the goal is to characterize the response surface over a fairly wide range, and
it is likely that a first or second order polynomial will not sufficiently characterize the
region, we consider a space-filling design. These designs are often used in deterministic
computer models when the shape of the response surface is unknown and thought to
be complex [53]. We choose a Latin Hypercube design with 200 runs because of its
space filling properties, as depicted in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Latin Hypercube Deign
After running the experiments we fit a surface to our response using a Gaussian
Process model. These are useful in deterministic computer models because they fit
the surface through each point. The estimated surface is not an exact representation
of the true surface but allows for an examination of the region. This Gaussian Process
surface is depicted in Figure 13. The estimated response surface highlights a dramatic
decrease in coverage at a minimum stand-off distance of greater than 39 miles. Outside
of this region the minimum stand-off distance parameter is not extremely sensitive
to adjustments. Examining the effect of maximum coverage radius we notice that,
above 275 miles the objective function value becomes fairly insensitive to the minimum
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stand-off distance.
Figure 13. Gaussian Process Surface for the current unit location objective function
value under the Pessimistic Scenario
Next we fit an 8th order polynomial and explore the region as we hold one of
these parameters constant, as depicted in Figure 14. The graph on the left side of
Figure 14 depicts coverage as maximum coverage radius is held at 250 miles and
minimum stand off distance is varied from 0 to 50 miles. The graph on the right
side of Figure 14 depicts coverage as minimum stand-off distance is held constant at
25 miles and maximum coverage radius is varied from 200 to 300 mile. We observe
again the sensitivity of the response to a minimum stand-off distance greater than
39 miles. We also note that coverage appears to have a pseudo linear relationship
with maximum coverage radius. The change in coverage appears to be dramatic
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but we must remember we are experimenting over a large range of the experimental
region. For example the maximum coverage radius range, in terms of hours, varies
from a four hour to six hour response. A two hour difference in response can have
a dramatic effect on lives saved in a catastrophic CBRN event. Minor deviations in
either parameter result in small changes in coverage, which leads us to conclude the
model is fairly insensitive to minor deviations in these two parameters.
Figure 14. Response Surface using an 8th order Polynomial Fit with respect to mini-
mum stand-off distance and maximum coverage radius, respectively, for WMD-CSTs
4.7 CRE Coverage
Similar to the WMD-CST echelon coverage, we analyze the coverage provided by
the CRE in its entirety using the Baseline and Pessimistic scenarios. Each echelon has
a respective coverage radius that is based on doctrine and current DoD guidance. The
minimum stand-off distance for the Pessimistic Scenario remains unchanged from the
WMD-CST analysis and is the same for each echelon. Different from the WMD-CST
model, a county must be covered by a WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF in order for it
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to be considered covered. Thus, the coverage estimate for this model will always be
less than or equal to the model that only considers WMD-CST coverage. We remind
the reader that each HRF has a CERFP capability within its structure. Thus, a
HRF located within the CERFP coverage radius can provide both CERFP and HRF
echelon coverage. If the closest HRF exists outside the CERFP coverage radius, but
within the HRF coverage radius it will provide HRF-echelon coverage only.
4.7.1 CRE Baseline Scenario: Current CRE Unit Locations.
The current coverage provided by the CRE is just over 269 million or 88% of the
population, as depicted in Figure 15. A total of 22 of the 706 uncovered counties have
populations exceeding 250,000.
Different from the previous analysis, when examining the entire CRE, there is
additional risk in densely populated areas such as San Diego and Phoenix. Further-
more, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Oklahoma, and New Mexico are all
states wherein the majority of the population is uncovered when the entirety of the
CRE is considered. These states are not the most likely for a population-oriented
terrorist attack, but the lucrative nature of other CBRN events in these states may
merit concern and adjustment to the CRE to improve coverage. Finally, similar to
the WMD-CST analysis, we note the risk that exists in the densely populated area
of southern Florida.
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Figure 15. CRE Current Coverage Baseline Scenario
4.7.2 CRE Baseline Scenario: Optimal CRE Unit Locations.
We further evaluate the current structure by comparing it to an optimal structure
that utilizes the same number of units at each echelon. The optimal structure covers
99.93% of the population as depicted in Figure 16. This structure requires 47 WMD-
CST relocations, 15 CERFP relocations, and 10 HRF relocations. This equates to
relocating the entire structure less 5 WMD-CSTs.
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Figure 16. CRE Optimal Coverage Baseline Scenario
This structure covers all counties with populations greater than 250,000 and leaves
only one county with a population greater than 50,000 uncovered. This demonstrates
that significant improvements exist within the current structure.
4.7.3 CRE Pessimistic Scenario: Current CRE Unit Locations.
We now apply the Pessimistic Scenario to the current CRE unit locations which
results in 83% of the population being covered as depicted in Figure 17. This rep-
resents approximately 5% decrease from the Baseline Scenario when accounting for
risk to CRE assets and their coverage capabilities. A total of 35 counties with popu-
lation greater than 250,000 are uncovered; this is an increase of 13 counties from the
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Baseline Scenario.
Figure 17. CRE Current Coverage Pessimistic Scenario
4.7.4 CRE Pessimistic: Optimal CRE Unit Locations.
We again identify an optimal structure to compare to the current structure. The
optimal CRE unit locations covers 99.46% of the population, as depicted in Figure
18. This structure relocates all but four WMD-CSTs.
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Figure 18. CRE Optimal Coverage Pessimistic Scenario
The coverage provided by the Pessimistic Scenario is only 0.27% less than the
Baseline scenario but the Pessimistic Scenario again places CRE units in less vulner-
able locations. This is measured by the total population CRE units are colocated
with. The Baseline Scenario colocates CRE units with 18.7 million people compared
to 12.4 million using the the Pessimistic Scenarion. Similar to the WMD-CST only
model this is a significant reduction. It is also worth noting the current CRE unit
locations are colocated with 44.8 million people, thus, the reduction in colocated pop-
ulation from current unit locations to the optimal Pessimistic Scenario unit locations
is approximately 72%. Additionally, the percentage of the population that is dou-
ble covered by all three CRE echelons is 10% for the Baseline Scenario and 20% for
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the Pessimistic Scenario. This demonstrates the value in applying the Pessimistic
Scenario to future planning.
4.7.5 Uncovered Counties by Echelon.
Since CRE coverage depends on three different echelons, note that the coverage
maps in Figures 15 - 18 do not depict which echelon or echelons are not providing
coverage to an uncovered county. In Figure 19, we represent the percent of the
population uncovered by each each echelon across each of the four instances previously
considered.
Figure 19. Uncovered population by unit type
For each scenario, the CERFP echelon is the most in need of modifications to
improve coverage.
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4.7.6 Resources Required for Full Coverage.
Since the optimal solutions did not achieve full coverage for the entire population,
an examination of the number of teams needed to achieve full coverage is warranted.
Moreover, political bureaucratic obstacles may preclude possible unit relocations and
force all modifications to occur by establishing additional teams. We therefore identify
the minimum additional teams needed to achieve full coverage in the Baseline and
Pessimistic Scenario for both the current unit locations and optimal unit locations.
Figure 20 depicts the additional teams needed to achieve full coverage for the four
instances previously analyzed.
Figure 20. Additional units needed to achieve full coverage
To achieve full coverage with current unit locations in both scenarios, at least
30 additional teams of varying types are need. The optimal solutions require the
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addition of fewer teams but require the relocation of at least 72 total CRE units in
both instances.
None of these solutions are very cost effective and thus are not likely to be imple-
mented. We now seek to balance an increase in coverage with the cost of modifications.
4.7.7 Myopic View of Each Echelon.
To further analyze the trade-off between relocations at each echelon and coverage,
we construct a myopic view for each echelon. This myopic view is examined using
the Pessimistic Scenario since it was shown to be the more useful scenario. As we
consider each echelon we assume the other echelons provide full coverage, and thus
coverage is only dependent on the echelon under consideration. This will highlight
the minimum number of relocations at each echelon necessary to achieve a certain
level of coverage. We use this method due to the computationally expensive process
of exploring all 7,800 combinations of WMD-CST, CERFP, and HRF locations. By
comparing myopic views we can establish the upper bound on coverage for a given
number of relocations at each echelon. This allows a decision maker to visualize
the range of alternatives and the corresponding best case coverage estimate for each
alternative. In this analysis we seek to obtain 98% coverage as a goal for each echelon,
but other minimum coverage standards could be considered.
4.7.7.1 Myopic View: HRF.
Figure 21 depicts coverage as the number of HRF relocations increases from 0 to
10. With five relocations we can improve coverage well above 99%, and with three
relocations coverage improves to just over 98%. This indicates the maximum number
of HRF relocations is likely not greater than five, and three is relatively efficient to
improve HRF echelon coverage.
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Figure 21. HRF Myopic View
4.7.7.2 Myopic View: CERFP.
It is important to again note that the CERFP echelon coverage is impacted by
HRF unit locations. Thus, we vary the allowable CERFP relocations from 0 to 15,
while we vary the allowable HRF relocations from 0 to 10. Figure 22 highlights
how coverage is influenced by the CERFP echelon. Relocating up to four HRFs
has a significant impact on the coverage provided by CERFPs but after that point
coverage is primarily a function of CERFP relocations. Additionally, as the number of
CERFP relocations increases, the impact of HRF relocations diminishes. From this,
we determine approximately five CERFPs and three HRFs relocations are needed to
achieve approximately 98% coverage.
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Figure 22. CERFP Myopic View
4.7.7.3 Myopic View: WMD-CST.
Finally, we analyze the WMD-CST only structure. The reader may recall this
analysis is identical to the analysis conducted in the WMD-CST only model. We
present Figure 23 as an updated representation of Figure 9 under the Pessimistic
Scenario.
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Figure 23. WMD-CST Myopic View
We can achieve 98% coverage with seven WMD-CST relocations.
4.7.7.4 Myopic View: Full CRE.
Combining each myopic view, we can now examine which echelon is driving cov-
erage for a specific number of relocations, as depicted in Figure 24. It is important
to note Figure 24 highlights the upper bound on coverage for a specified number of
relocations at each echelon. Some counties are uncovered by multiple units and, thus,
adding coverage at one echelon may not add coverage for the full structure. The com-
bined myopic views identify the minimum number of relocations necessary at each
echelon to achieve a specified coverage level.
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As previously suspected, the CERFP echelon is the most in need of improvement.
To achieve greater than 98% coverage we need to relocate at least three HRFs, five
CERFPs, and seven WMD-CSTs.
Maintaining the same objective function and constraints while imposing our lower
bound of at least three HRFs, five CERFPs, and seven WMD-CSTs relocations we
achieve coverage of 95.44%.
Figure 24. CRE coverage by echelon with CCP
4.8 Model Extension
We have examined how many additional teams are needed to achieve full coverage
and how many relocations at each echelon are needed to achieve near-full coverage, but
we have not analyzed if efficient gains in coverage can be achieved through additions
and/or relocations. To identify solutions that answer this question, we develop an
extension to our previous model. First, we introduce the following additional decision
variables and parameters.
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4.8.1 Decision Variables.
• x`a : Number of teams added at echelon ` ∈ L.
• x`r : Number of teams relocated at echelon ` ∈ L.
• zi : A binary decision variable equal to 1 if demand at node i is covered by a
facility at each echelon, and 0 otherwise, ∀ i ∈ D.
4.8.2 Parameters.
• δ : Increase in coverage required to either relocate or add a team.
• c`a : Cost to add a team at echelon ` ∈ L.
• c`r : Cost to relocate a team at echelon ` ∈ L.
• B : Budget for unit relocations and additions.
• z¯ : Vector representing counties that are covered by current unit locations, 1 if
a county is covered, 0 otherwise.
• ψ`j : A Binary parameter equal to 1 if a unit at echelon ` is currently located at
location j, 0 otherwise,
• p` : Number of current units at echelon `.
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4.8.3 Formulation.
∑
i∈D
hizi − δ
∑
l∈L
(
x`a + x
`
r
) ≥∑
i∈D
hiz¯, (4.1)
∑
j∈N
y`j − x`a ≤ p`, ∀ ` ∈ L, (4.2)
∑
j∈N
ψ`jy
`
j + x
`
r ≥ p`, ∀ ` ∈ L, (4.3)
∑
`∈L
(
c`ax
`
a + c
`
rx
`
r
) ≤ B, (4.4)
x`a ∈ Z+, ∀ ` ∈ L, (4.5)
x`r ∈ Z+, ∀ ` ∈ L. (4.6)
Constraint (4.1) requires the objective to improve by at least δ for a team to be
either added or relocated. Constraint (4.2) bounds the number of teams at echelon `
by the current number of teams at that echelon plus the number added. Constraint
(4.3) restricts the number of current unit locations in the solution to the current
number of teams minus relocations. Constraint (4.4) restricts the total number of
adjustments at all echelons. Finally, Constraints (4.5) and (4.6) restrict the number
of teams added and relocated to be integer-valued.
4.8.4 Extension Application.
The extension is applied in a different manner for the WMD-CST only structure
and the entirety of the CRE. This is done due to available data for cost estimations.
WMD-CSTs were established as apart of the CRE and accurate cost estimates are
available from the GAO [30]. The CERFP and HRF echelons were created from
existing units which complicates estimating costs. Furthermore, there is limited open
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source cost estimates available for either echelon. For this reason, we estimate cost
parameters when applying the extension to the WMD-CST only structure but do not
when applying the extension to the CRE in its entirety. The extension applied to the
entire CRE uses simplified costs that treat each relocation and addition as equal at
each echelon. While this is not the most accurate estimate, in general it is reasonable
to assume minimizing total change is desirable.
4.8.5 Extension Applied to WMD-CST.
4.8.5.1 Parameter Estimation.
According to the 2006 GAO report [30], the cost of establishing the first 55 WMD-
CSTs was $424 million. This equates to a cost of $7.7 million per team establishment.
Given the current structure covers an estimated 278 million people, that entails an
estimated fixed cost of $1.44 per person covered, not accounting for annual operational
costs. If we apply the same cost per person to the uncovered population, which
is approximately 27.8 million, we can establish an incremental expenditure that is
equivalent to the initial expenditure in terms of cost per person. Based on this, we
estimate the allowable incremental expenditure in order to achieve 100% coverage to
be approximately $40 million. At $7.7 million per team, this results in a budget of
establishing five new WMD-CSTs.
Given the WMD-CST structure currently in place, we note that additional teams
will not increase coverage as efficiently as the first teams did; with 91% of the pop-
ulation already covered under the Pessimistic Scenario the efficiency of coverage for
new teams will be significantly reduced. For this reason, we estimate the minimum
population increase to be in line with the coverage provided by the ten teams that
cover the fewest people within the current structure. We use three estimates, as de-
picted in Table 4.8.5.1: a maximum, average, and minimum population covered by
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the least efficient WMD-CSTs in the current structure to denote considered values
for δ.
Table 2. Estimates for Minimum Population Increase per Team Modification
Bottom 10 Teams δ
Minimum 422,867
Average 2,013,113
Maximum 4,839,078
We also consider two possible situations: First, the cost of relocations is equal to
the cost of establishing new teams, and second, the cost of relocations is half the cost
of establishing a new team. Relocations do not require the fielding of new equipment
or additional personnel, and thus may cost less.
Table 3. Equal Cost for Team Addition and Relocation
δ xa xr Cost
Population
Covered
Increase in
Population
Covered
Increase
Per Cost
422,867 5 0 5 97.43% 6.50% 1.30%
2,013,113 5 0 5 97.43% 6.50% 1.30%
4,839,078 3 0 3 95.70% 4.77% 1.59%
In both situations, using the minimum or average δ, the model is bounded by
Constraint (4.4), and we achieve the maximum increase in coverage. Using the maxi-
mum value of δ the model is bounded by Constraint (4.1) and yields the solution with
the most cost-efficient solution. When relocations and additions have equal costs, the
model only considers adding teams. This occurs because adding a team will always
increase coverage by a value greater than or equal to the coverage added by relocating
a team.
These estimates require verification from a subject matter expert prior to im-
plementing any of these solutions, but the preceding analyses demonstrate how the
parameters impact the output from the model extension.
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Table 4. Team Addition is Half the Cost of Relocation
δ xa xr Cost
Population
Covered
Increase in
Population
Covered
Increase
Per Cost
422,867 0 10 5 98.95% 8.01% 1.60%
2,013,113 0 10 5 98.95% 8.01% 1.60%
4,839,078 2 1 2.5 95.70% 4.77% 1.91%
4.8.6 Extension Applied to CRE.
As previously mentioned, there is limited information available to develop param-
eter estimates for the entire CRE structure. For this reason, we choose to generalize
the addition of a team as equally cost prohibitive and we seek to minimize the total
changes. We define the minimum increase per relocation to be at least 1 million
people. Using these parameters we highlight the trade-off in coverage as we increase
the limit on total modifications to the CRE structure.
Table 5. CRE Adjustments
Percent
Covered
Total
Adjustments
xWa x
W
r x
C
a x
C
r x
H
a x
H
r
90% 5 1 1 2 0 0 1
92% 8 3 0 2 1 0 2
94% 11 1 2 2 2 0 4
96% 16 5 1 4 1 0 5
98% 20 7 1 4 2 0 6
99% 25 8 2 8 1 0 6
To achieve 98% coverage, a 15% increase from the current structure, we need to
relocate 9 CRE assets and add 11 CRE assets. We again note that these solutions
demonstrate the validity of the model, but more refined input is needed from subject
matter experts and decision makers to produce solutions that can guide changes to
the entire CRE structure.
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4.9 Conclusion
In Chapter 4 we evaluated the coverage at the WMD-CST echelon and the CRE
in its entirety. The WMD-CST analysis highlighted that the current coverage under
the Baseline Scenario appears sufficient but improvements do exist. Application of
the Pessimistic Scenario identified counties that have an increased risk level. While
full coverage cannot be achieved by relocating every existing team, we can achieve
99% coverage with as few as ten WMD-CST relocations in either scenario. We further
demonstrated the value of incorporating a pessimistic view into future modifications
to the structure of the force. We also evaluated the sensitivity of the WMD-CST
model to selected distance parameters.
The full CRE analysis also demonstrated improvements to the structure are possi-
ble. We again demonstrated the value of incorporating a pessimistic view into future
planning considerations. We explored the resources needed for full coverage but de-
termined they were cost prohibitive. A myopic view was used to explore how each
echelon bounded the total coverage provided by the CRE.
Finally, we developed an extension to the model that maximizes coverage while
balancing between additions and relocations, keeps modifications within a required
budget, and ensures a minimum increase in coverage per change to the structure.
Parameters were estimated to demonstrate the validity of this model.
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V. Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Conclusions
In this chapter, we summarize the major contributions of this research and pro-
pose directions for future research. This analysis demonstrated the value of applying
previously proven facility location modeling techniques to evaluate and recommend
improvements to the nation’s CRE. With further input from subject matter experts
and stakeholders, feasible solutions that further improve the CRE’s coverage capabil-
ities can be developed.
5.1.1 WMD-CST Structure.
The WMD-CST structural analysis found that sharing of WMD-CST assets across
state boundaries greatly enhances the WMD-CST coverage capability. The current
structure, using the existing definition of coverage, was found to be quite sufficient,
covering approximately 95% of the population. Adjustments to the WMD-CST struc-
ture, however, most notably in Southern Florida, can increase the population covered
by 12.6 million people to 99.99% total population covered. We also found every county
in Florida and New York, states that both have fought to maintain two WMD-CST
teams, could be covered with only one team located in each respective state.
The use of a Pessimistic Scenario demonstrated the effect of a 10 kiloton nu-
clear attack on the CRE’s capability to rapidly respond. This analysis identified an
additional 4% of the population, which includes 12 additional counties having a pop-
ulation greater than 250,000, that are uncovered if a CBRN attack were to neutralize
CRE units within a 25 mile radius. Whereas the Pessimistic Scenario shows a signif-
icant reduction in coverage for current unit locations, there is only a 0.1% difference
in population coverage for the optimal CRE locations between the two scenarios.
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Furthermore, the Pessimistic Scenario reduces the risk to WMD-CSTs and improves
the redundancy of coverage. Overall, the Pessimistic Scenario is a valuable planning
consideration to incorporate in future modifications to the WMD-CST structure.
Because optimal solutions in both the Baseline and Pessimistic Scenarios may
be cost prohibitive, we analyzed the trade-off between coverage and cost. We found
near-full-coverage requires 25 to 32 moves for the Baseline and Pessimistic Scenarios,
respectively. Most of the gain in coverage, however, can be achieved with less than a
20% modification to the WMD-CST structure. Finally, we examined the sensitivity
of the model to the minimum stand-off distance and maximum coverage radius for
the Pessimissitc Scenario and found coverage to be relatively insensitive to minor
adjustments in the respective parameters.
5.1.2 CRE Structure.
The analysis of the entire CRE structure, using the Baseline Scenario, identified
35 million people to be living outside the rapid response window of at least one
echelon of CRE units, to include 22 uncovered counties having populations greater
than 250,000. An optimal placement of units significantly improves coverage, leaving
only one county with a population exceeding 50,000 uncovered.
We again noted the advantage of the Pessimistic Scenario’s optimal solution, as
it yields a significant decrease in risk to CRE units and improves the percentage of
the population that has redundant coverage. Furthermore, there is only a 0.27%
reduction in total population coverage when comparing optimal solutions for the
Pessimistic Scenario and Baseline Scenario.
The CERFP echelon was shown to have the greatest shortfall in coverage in both
scenarios, implying it is the CRE echelon most in need of modifications to improve
overall coverage.
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5.1.3 Model Extension.
Given full coverage was cost prohibitive for the WMD-CST structure and the full
CRE structure, we introduced a modeling extension that minimizes modifications to
the structure but produces relatively large improvements in coverage. This model-
ing extension also accounts for different costs between adding and relocating teams,
and it requires a minimum improvement to coverage to justify modifications to the
structure. We developed model parameters for the WMD-CST structure based on ex-
isting cost estimates and demonstrated the usefulness of our modeling extension. The
parameter estimates were developed differently for the full CRE due to limited cost
information for the entire structure. Thus, we generalized cost estimates to assume
all modifications to the structure are equally undesirable. Through this analysis we
found the number of modifications needed to achieve different coverage levels; most
notably, 98% coverage can be achieved with only 20 total adjustments to the CRE
structure.
5.2 Directions for Future Research
We suggest the following areas to improve and/or extend the utility of this re-
search.
5.2.1 Assumptions, Data, and Parameter Estimate Improvements.
Although our analysis provides significant insights, subject matter expert and
stakeholder input is needed to refine assumptions, confirm or modify the network
utilized, and validate parameter estimates.
First, we note the network was an estimation of the true network and is worth
examining to ensure it sufficiently represents demands and facility locations. For
example, the use of all counties as demands, especially those with populations under
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50,000, may not provide enough focus on the demands with a much greater probability
of attack. Second, some locations recommended as future CRE unit locations may
not be feasible if CRE units are required to use existing federal or state facilities.
Reducing possible facility locations to pre-approved CRE unit locations would result
in solutions that need fewer modifications to implement. Finally, estimating current
unit locations at population centers could introduce some error. Including the true
locations would provide an increased level of confidence in the analysis. It should be
noted this change would likely produce marginal differences to this analysis.
Another area for improvement is clarifying two assumptions related to the CERFP
and HRF echelon. First, we assumed that a HRF could provide CERFP capability
based on the HRF’s structure but this should be confirmed by a subject matter expert.
Second, the deployment procedures for CERFPs and HRFs is not explicitly defined
in any doctrine or guidance that we reviewed. We assumed that the geographically
dispersed CERFPs and HRFs would assemble at their respective CERFP or HRF
headquarters and then deploy to an incident site. It is possible, however, that each
component of a HRF or CERFP would assemble at their respective location and then
assemble as a complete CERFP or HRF at a location closer to the incident. Clarifying
this deployment process is necessary to more accurately represent response times and
thus the coverage provided by a team.
5.2.2 Coverage Definition.
The binary coverage definition utilized provides useful information but is not the
only technique for modeling coverage. It may be worth exploring the idea of changing
the definition of coverage from binary to an indication of coverage efficiency. For
example, using the binary definition, the coverage provided for a county that exists
either one mile inside the coverage radius or one mile outside the coverage radius is
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dramatically different. One location is fully covered and the other is not, but they
only exist two miles apart from each other. Using a non-binary indicator can provide
additional context to a county’s level of coverage. Different coverage radii based on
threat or population could also be used to prioritize the proximity of coverage to the
most likely targets of a CBRN attack. The definition best suited for this analysis
needs to be developed using input from the subject matter experts and stakeholders.
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